Bill on introduction of 35-hour week rejected

Download article in original language : GR9910154FEL.DOC

The introduction of a 35-hour working week occupies a prominent and controversial place on the Greek industrial relations agenda in autumn 1999. As well as discussions within the national social dialogue process and collective agreements at sector and company levels, a bill on the issue was submitted and discussed in parliament in September 1999, though without reaching a positive conclusion.

On 7 and 9 September 1999, the standing committee for social affairs of the summer session of parliament discussed and rejected a private member's bill introduced by the Coalition of the Left and Progress regarding "introduction of the 35-hour working week and other provisions". This issue is currently topical in Greece, with controversial discussions underway in the national social dialogue process (GR9908147N) and collective agreements at sectoral (GR9906135F) and company (GR9810197N) level starting to deal with the matter.

Basic principles of the bill

The preamble to the private member's bill links the need to introduce the 35-hour working week without loss of pay to the prospect that it will help address the problem of unemployment, boost employment and increase workers' free time. It invokes the experiences of other European countries which are reducing working time and general international trends and developments, together with the fact that Greece is among the countries of the European Union where actual working time is longest (averaging 40.8 hours per week) and competitiveness of the economy is lowest. The latter element also constitutes an argument against the contrary view which maintains that implementation of the measure would increase labour costs and worsen the competitive position of the Greek economy. This is because low Greek national competitiveness already coexists with low labour costs (17% of total production costs, compared to 30%-37% in the rest of the EU). The subsequent rise in labour costs by 1%-2% could, it is argued, be offset by increasing productivity through technological and organisational restructuring. The preamble is based on an economic and technical study by the Institute of Labour (INE) of the Greek General Confederation of Labour (GSEE) on implementation of the 35-hour week (GR9704110F), according to which its immediate introduction would create 130,000 new jobs and save 50,000 jobs which are in jeopardy.

The bill states that implementation of the 35-hour week should apply immediately to capital-intensive and profit-intensive enterprises. For the rest, primarily small and medium-sized enterprises, there should be a transitional stage during which incentives are introduced.

The bill considers it necessary to promote the 35-hour week through legislation, following the employers' continued refusal, despite their participation in relevant social dialogue committees, to accept such a measure either at national or sectoral level.

The basic principles of the bill are the following:

• generalised implementation of the 35-hour week at dates in the near future;

• maintenance of workers' pay;

• abolition of overtime;

• drastic reduction of hours worked exceeding maximum working hours, and pay increases for such hours;

• prevention of parallel introduction of "labour flexibility" (eg part-time work and working time reorganisation) designed to absorb the reduction in working time; and

• combination of the measure with a policy for growth (aiming at 3.5% GDP growth) and productivity increases, through technological and organisational modernisation of enterprises.

Specific proposals

The articles of the bill propose the following specific measures:

• implementation of the 35-hour week without loss of pay, in the form of a five-day working week and a seven-hour working day;

• implementation of this measure from 1 January 2000 in public utilities and services, banks, public administration and capital- and technology-intensive companies in the private sector on the basis of criteria to be set out in a relevant ministerial decision;

• implementation of the measure from 1 January 2001 for private labour-intensive enterprises employing more than 10 people;

• implementation of the measure from 1 January 2002 for private labour-intensive companies employing fewer than 10 people;

• approximation between statutory and contractual working hours, leading to abolition of overtime - ie working time in between statutory and contractual weekly working hours (40-45 hours or 48 hours);

• the most favourable regulation for workers through collective agreements;

• the ability to regulate the 35-hour week through collective agreements for enterprises working round the clock, the aim being to reorganise working time in shifts and not through collective working time arrangements;

• introduction of a 50% pay premium (instead of the current 25%) for the first 60 hours of overtime exceeding maximum working hours worked annually, 175% (instead of the current 50%) for 60-120 hours of such overtime, 200% (instead of the current 75%) for over 120 hours of such overtime, and 250% (instead of the current 100%) in cases where such overtime is unlawful;

• reduction by 50% of total statutory overtime exceeding maximum working hours, beginning on 1 February 2000;

• determination by ministerial decision of the amount and form of incentives to implement the 35-hour week. Incentives should apply only to enterprises where implementation of the measure will begin on 1 February 2001, on the condition that 12% or 15% reductions in working time will increase employment by at least 6% or 9% respectively. These incentives would be in the form of tax relief and assistance in rationalisation and modernisation to increase the productivity of enterprises; and

• creation of limits on the use of temporary and part-time employment in enterprises, by setting a maximum limit of 10% of the workforce for such forms of employment, a minimum working week of 20 hours for part-time workers and a premium of 25% on part-timers' hourly pay.

Positions of the political parties

During the discussion in parliament, only the deputies from the Coalition of the Left and Progress voted in favour of the bill. Although the ruling socialist PASOK party, as well as the main opposition party, the conservative Nea Dimokratia, agreed with the principle, they voted against the bill for the following reasons:

• promotion of the 35-hour week must be the subject of dialogue between employers and trade unions, and not the subject of legislation;

• generalised implementation of the measure will have negative consequences for the competitiveness of the economy, and particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises; and

• the dialogue process already under way between the GSEE and the employers' organisations demands that developments and the results of the dialogue be awaited without legislative interventions.

Finally, the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) rejected the private member's bill on the grounds that it needs to be revised, so as to avoid any possibility of combining implementation of the 35-hour week with labour flexibility.

Commentary

The discussion of the private member's bill on implementation of the 35-hour week is yet another example of the general thinking which seems to be developing at a slow but sure pace in Greece. However, its rejection by the great majority of the parliamentary parties, together with the strong resistance to the measure from the side of the employers, despite the fact that they have taken part in the dialogue on the subject, indicate that at this point in time the correlations of social and political forces are not favourable to a generalised implementation of the 35-hour week in Greece. (Giannis Kouzis, head of industrial relations section, INE/GSEE)