Unions' electoral strength exceeds membership

Martín Artiles, Antonio

Pregled

Članek

Unions' electoral strength exceeds membership

Objavljeno: 13 February 2005

The results of the most recent elections of workers' representatives in Spain, published in late 2004, confirm the dominance of the CC.OO and UGT trade union confederations. It is their electoral strength that is regarded as the source of the legitimacy and representativeness of Spanish trade unions, rather than their membership, which is low but stable, at around 17% of the wage-earning population.

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The results of the most recent elections of workers' representatives in Spain, published in late 2004, confirm the dominance of the CC.OO and UGT trade union confederations. It is their electoral strength that is regarded as the source of the legitimacy and representativeness of Spanish trade unions, rather than their membership, which is low but stable, at around 17% of the wage-earning population.

At the end of 2004, the results of the most recent 'trade union elections ' of company-level representatives (ES9902298F) and recent figures on trade union membership were published. Both sources were updated and summarised in a recent publication (Manual para la Sociología del Trabajo y Relaciones Laborales, H-D Köhler and A Martín, Delta Publicaciones, Madrid, 2005).

Representation and representativeness

One of the basic distinctions for analysing and comparing Spanish trade unions in the European framework is that between 'representation' and 'representativeness' used by the Committee on Freedom of Association of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), which applies universal criteria for recognising trade unions, guaranteeing democracy and avoiding trade union discrimination. These criteria are the number of members, the number of contributors and strength in relevant workforce elections However, the ILO recognises that these criteria are at times insufficient for analysing the situation in each country. Therefore, it suggests that representativeness should be defined according to the institutional relations, the conditions of the social partners and the socio-economic situation. In other words, representation is different from representativeness.

The concept of representation is in general linked to three criteria: a) the 'associative' criterion, based on the number of trade union members; b) the criterion of electoral strength, which is based on the principles of democracy and proportionality - ie the election of unions' delegates as workers' representatives to workers' committees, works councils etc; and c) and the 'legal-organisational' criterion, in terms of 'social power'.

The concept of representativeness emerged in the historical context of the 1920s, when trade unions were growing and becoming organised in many countries. There arose problems of concentration and competition between the different trade unions, and of ideological and political struggle between the different groups. The first references to the idea of trade union representativeness appear in the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 (Article 389), which also created the ILO. The notion of representativeness was shaped historically as a 'formula of transaction' between the principle of trade union freedom, in which the idea of plurality is implicit, and the protection of the collective interest of an occupation or activity by trade unions.

Spanish unions - more electoral strength than membership

Representativeness in the Spanish industrial relations system is based on the concept of electoral strength, which is the source of legitimacy of the trade unions. Around 57% of Spanish workers voted in workplace elections of representatives (ES0309203T) between 2001 and 2003, but the electoral regulations exclude workers in companies with fewer than six workers, while those with between six and 10 workers must make a formal application to participate, which limits the intervention of the trade unions. In other words, the criterion of electoral strength provides greater legitimacy to unions than that of membership, which currently represents 17% of the workforce, one of the lowest levels in Europe. However, this does not mean that the unions are weak on the political and social stage.

The source of legitimacy of Spanish trade unions arguably lies in the high percentage of participation in elections by workers, which goes beyond the 'representation' of the members proper. Furthermore, the results of the workplace elections allow the trade unions to participate in various institutions and consultative bodies (covering vocational training, social security, universities etc), and in collective bargaining commissions. Electoral strength is thus decisive for measuring the representativeness of trade unions.

In terms of the results of workplace elections, the leading organisations since 1978 have been the Trade Union Confederation of Workers’ Commissions (Comisiones Obreras, CC.OO) and the General Workers’ Confederation (Unión General de Trabajadores, UGT) - see table 1 below. Since the elections in 1986, these two trade union organisations have obtained about 70% of the delegates, at the cost of non-union members, whose presence on workers' committees has been falling since 1978. The proportion of all delegates put forward by these groups of workers and small, company trade unions, standing as 'independent trade unions', have fallen from 30.4% in the 1978 elections to 3% in 2003. The nationalist trade unions, such as Basque Workers' Solidarity (Eusko Langileen Alkartasuna/Sindicato de Trabajadores Vascos, ELA-STV) in the Basque Country and the Galician Union Confederation (Converxencia Intersindical Galega/Confederación Intersindical Galega, CIG) in Galicia, have increased their number of delegates.

Over the years the number of independent trade union delegates has fallen. Trade union representation is located mainly in companies with over 50 workers (about 60%). In other words, most delegates form part of workers' committees, which are the statutory form of representation in firms of this size. The main problem of trade unions representativeness lies in the difficulty of obtaining representatives in small companies, and the enormous difficulties of representing the large number of workers on temporary contracts. Trade union delegates are mainly male workers with stable jobs, aged between 30 and 49 and located in the 'primary' segment of the labour market. On the other hand, the workers in the 'secondary' segment are hardly represented, nor are those in the 'underground' economy or temporary workers. Therefore, if one ignores these groups and only takes into account the workers in the primary sector with stable jobs, then electoral representativeness is high and unions have a high level of legitimacy.

**Table 1. Results of trade union elections. Number of delegates elected, 1978-2003**
Union	1978	1980	1982	1986	1990	1994-5	1998	2003*
CC.OO	66,540	50,817	47,016	56,965	87,738	77,348	81,314	106,654
UGT	41,897	48,194	51,672	66,411	99,737	77,112	76,382	110,495
ELA	1,931	4,024	4,642	5,372	7,488	7,146	7,267	9,035
CIG	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,595
Other unions	25,953	22,053	25,058	28,726	33,901	42,351	49,739	46,073
Other small unions	58,725	43,553	17,024	12,708	8,407	6,631	8,969	8,337

Sources: 'Memoria sobre la situación socio-económica de España', Ecocomic and Social Council, 2004; and 'Afiliación sindical en Europa', Pere Beneyto, Valencia, Germanía, 2004.

In terms of electoral representativeness, coverage - ie the total percentage of workers employed with trade union representation - is relatively high. Coverage is high in sectors such as banking (82%), water, gas and electricity (68%), public administration (64%), health (61%) and education 51%). It is low in sectors such as agriculture and fisheries (16%), hotels and catering (21%), construction (26%) and retailing (34%). Coverage is thus lower in the sectors with a higher proportion of temporary and unstable employment. On the other hand, it is higher in sectors with greater job security, such as the public sector (67%). The private sector has coverage of 37% (see Afiliación sindical en Europa, Pere Beneyto, Valencia, Germanía, 2004).

Development of trade union membership

The development of trade union membership in Spain can be divided into four periods, which follow a very similar pattern to the evolution of employment - see table 2 below.

The first period corresponds to the start of the political transition from dictatorship to democracy (1975-8), when membership rose to about 18% of the wage-earning population. Though the figures are not very reliable, this growth was thought to be due to political reasons associated with major industrial conflict and the euphoric climate of the transition. Further, the oil crises of 1973 and 1979 had not yet had significant negative effects on employment. However, this was a period of great division among trade unions, and the struggle for dominance between CC.OO and the UGT matched the fight for political hegemony between the left-wing political parties, the Communist Party (Partido Comunista de España, PCE) and the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE).

The second period, between 1979 and 1985, was characterised by a sharp fall in trade union membership (-30.9% in 1980 and -6.5% in 1985) during a serious economic crisis and a poor climate for trade unions, whose main features were a sharp increase in unemployment, industrial restructuring, redundancies, a reduction in purchasing power and a policy of pacts aimed at controlling inflation. Therefore, there was no possibility of using what have been referred to as 'incentives of identity' or 'material incentives' to maintain trade union membership. However, in this period the unions managed to obtain 'functional incentives' such as the 1985 Trade Union Freedom Law (Ley Orgánica de Libertad Sindical, LOLS), which favoured the concentration of electoral representativeness in the large trade unions, CC.OO and the UGT.

During the third period, between 1986 and 1990, membership grew again moderately ( 0.5%), now stimulated by growth in employment (though this was largely temporary recruitment) and the improvement of the economic prospects. In this period industrial conflict broke out again, which may have reinforced the 'incentives of identity' and the 'material incentives' for union membership, insofar as employment improved and purchasing power rose.

In the fourth period, from 1990 to the present, there has been a sharp rise in the number of members ( 7.7% in 1995, 3.8% in 2000 and 11.8% in 2003). However, the 'net rate' of membership (ie union density) has been relatively stable. It is surprising that during the economic crisis and job losses between 1991 and 1994, trade union membership did not fall. The possible reasons are the brevity of the crisis and the rapid recovery of employment and wages as of 1995. The notion of 'material incentives' may explain the sustained growth in union membership. However, temporary employment with a high employee turnover has hindered growth. Despite this, Spanish unions have been modernised during the last five years, and have opened their ranks to new sectors such as the service sector. The image of trade unions composed of unskilled blue-collar industrial members is a thing of the past. The proportion of members in the traditional sectors has fallen. That of sectors with a higher level of qualification such as the public administration, health and education has risen.

**Table 2. Trade union membership and wage-earning population, 1977-2003,**
Year	Members		Wage-earning population		Net membership rate (%)
Year	No.	% variation	No..	% variation	Net membership rate (%)
1977	1,606,600	-	8,705,200	-	18.4
1980	1,109,600	-30.7	8,065,600	-7.3	13.7
1985	1,037,000	-6.5	7,309,200	-9.4	14.2
1990	1,561,200	0.5	9,273,400	6.8	16.8
1995	1,838,600	7.7	8,942,700	-3.4	20.5
2000	2,093,500	3.3	12,285,700	7.4	17.0
2003	2,342,000	11.8	13,730,300	11.7	17.0

Source: The figures for 1995 and 2003 were provided by trade unions in Beneyto 2004 (cited above).

Commentary

The Spanish trade unions have been modernised in the last two decades, reflecting their adaptation to the new structure of employment. They have therefore lost influence in the industrial sector, particularly CC.OO, which previously had the image of being a trade union organisations for 'industrial workers'. In 1980, it had 77.9% of its membership in industry and only 16.8% in services. By 2002, this proportion has been reversed, with 35.7% in industry and 64.3% in services. UGT, which already in the 1980s had the image of an organisation more rooted in services, has now accentuated this characteristic. The challenge for both union confederations is to represent the peripheral segments of the labour market and particularly workers on temporary contracts (A Martín Artiles, Quit-UAB).

Eurofound priporoča, da to publikacijo navedete na naslednji način.

Eurofound (2005), Unions' electoral strength exceeds membership, article.