European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions

Evaluating the quality of society and public services

Second European Quality of Life Survey

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Research project: Monitoring quality of life in Europe

European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions

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Foreword

The European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS) was conducted by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound) for the first time in 2003, covering 28 countries (the 15 EU Member States, 12 forthcoming Member States and Turkey). Eurofound's second round of the EQLS, which was carried out in 2007, offers a wide-ranging view of the diverse social realities in 31 countries – the current 27 EU Member States, Norway and the candidate countries of Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey.

Many of the questions posed in the first EQLS in 2003 were asked again, on issues such as employment, income, education, housing, family, health, work–life balance, life satisfaction and perceived quality of society. In 2008, Eurofound commissioned secondary analyses of the EQLS data around key policy themes. The selected themes for the first round of secondary analysis are the following: trends in quality of life in Europe 2003–2008; living conditions, social exclusion and mental well-being; family life and work; subjective well-being; and quality of society and public services.

This analytical report focuses on the latter theme – *Evaluating the quality of society and public services* – highlighting how both factors are fundamental to people's quality of life. The report draws on the results of the EQLS to create innovative indexes for the quality of societies and public services, identifying differences between European countries and on the basis of individual characteristics and resources. In doing so, it examines how people evaluate the factors impacting on quality of society – including key public services, neighbourhood environment and crime, access to health services, along with trust in institutions and people, and perceived tensions in society.

It is intended that the report will highlight policies that could increase social cohesion during challenging times in Europe. We hope that this study will contribute towards assessing and improving the quality of society and its services, and in turn, people's quality of life across Europe today.

Jorma Karppinen
Director

Erika Mezger
Deputy Director

Country codes

EU15 15 EU Member States prior to enlargement in 2004 (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom)

NMS12 12 New Member States, 10 of which joined the EU in 2004 (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) – and are sometimes referred to as the NMS10 – and the remaining two in 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania)

EU27 27 EU Member States

EU27

AT	Austria
BE	Belgium
BG	Bulgaria
CY	Cyprus
CZ	Czech Republic
DK	Denmark
EE	Estonia
FI	Finland
FR	France
DE	Germany
EL	Greece
HU	Hungary
IE	Ireland
IT	Italy
LV	Latvia
LT	Lithuania
LU	Luxembourg
MT	Malta
NL	Netherlands
PL	Poland
PT	Portugal
RO	Romania
SK	Slovakia
SI	Slovenia
ES	Spain
SE	Sweden
UK	United Kingdom

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Executive summary

Introduction

A person's quality of life is not only shaped by individual choices and behaviour: the surrounding environment and the public services on offer have a big influence on how people perceive the society they live in and on their evaluation of their own quality of life. Institutions influence the quality of society through collective actions that individuals cannot undertake themselves: for example maintaining schools, hospitals and roads. Public policies are also responsible for ensuring that water and air are not polluted, and for reducing tensions between different social groups. If public policies are effective and these services are provided to a high standard, the quality of society will improve, with a positive impact on the overall quality of life of citizens.

This is why European policymakers and citizens share a common concern regarding the quality of society and public services: the actions of policymakers should contribute to improving the quality of citizens' lives. To evaluate whether this is in fact happening, one needs to look beyond objective measures of material wealth such as gross domestic product (GDP) and find out how citizens assess the conditions in their society. The second European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS), carried out by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound) in 2007, asks European citizens to evaluate multiple aspects of quality of society. The result is a comprehensive picture of the diverse social realities in the 27 EU Member States, in Norway, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey.

Because the quality of society cannot be reduced to a single measurement figure, the report presents a number of innovative indexes based on answers to the EQLS: a Public Services Index, a Neighbourhood Services Index, a Health Service Index, an index measuring trust in institutions and one measuring tensions in society. Based on the analysis of these indexes, the report goes on to identify the extent to which the quality of society and public services differ between European countries. The analysis also shows that there are differences in the evaluation of society within countries associated with differences in income, age and gender.

Policy context

The aim of advancing the quality of society in Europe today creates fresh challenges in an EU that brings together 27 different countries. It means promoting social cohesion in societies that are becoming more diverse internally, as increasing numbers of people take advantage of the entitlement to travel and work across the Union. In addition, the economic crisis leads to demands to prevent European societies from being divided between those who have not been immediately affected by the downturn and others who have. The EU's success in responding to these challenges is essential, insofar as European integration depends for its legitimacy on effectively promoting the quality of European society for all Europe's citizens. But it is not only the EU and its institutions that are challenged by these developments. All those providing services that contribute to the quality of society – national, regional and local governments, as well as social partners and civil society institutions – must address the evaluations made by citizens and hence improve policies and action.

Key findings

- The Public Services Index covers education, healthcare, public transport, childcare, care for the elderly and the pension systems. The majority of European citizens assess these services positively. Evaluations regarding public services are, however, relatively higher among Europeans who have

an adequate income and lower in countries where government corruption is regarded as being at a high level.

- The Neighbourhood Services Index deals with air and noise pollution, waste collection, water quality, green spaces and crime. Overall, the results are positive: 42% of Europeans have no complaints about any of these six areas and less than one in 10 has many complaints. Satisfaction with neighbourhood services and crime control is substantially lower in urban areas and, within cities, for people living in neighbourhoods with a greater racial or ethnic mix. In countries where the government operates with little corruption, the rating is higher.

- A statutory entitlement to healthcare services is insufficient to deliver treatment: people must have access to healthcare services. The Health Services Index measures this by asking about difficulties in getting an appointment, travel time to a surgery or clinic, waiting time to see a doctor, and the cost of charges. On average, 76% of European citizens report that none of these elements is a barrier to getting access to health services. Older people and women report relatively few obstacles to healthcare services access. Among those with low income, a greater proportion have problems claiming treatment to which they are entitled.

- Trust in political institutions varies between the police and legal system, where it is high, and parliament and political parties, where it is low. On the whole, Europeans tend to be sceptical rather than trustful or distrustful of political institutions. Significant differences in trust arise between the EU15 and the NMS12, which reflects the extent to which national governments are seen as transparent or relatively corrupt. Within countries, income differences have a considerable impact on trust in both political institutions and fellow citizens.

- According to the Economic Tensions Index, a third of EQLS respondents report a lot of tension between workers and management, and between rich and poor people. Material circumstances chiefly influence the perception of economic tensions: those who are more deprived, have an inadequate income or live in worse off regions are more likely to feel a sense of economic tension.

- For the Racial, Ethnic and Religious Tensions Index, 40% of European citizens surveyed perceive a lot of tension between different racial and ethnic groups. 31% indicate a lot of tension between different religious groups, and 50% see some tension in each area of intergroup relations. The national context has a major impact on this index: tension is much higher in the EU15 countries than in the NMS12. This may be due to the fact that countries with a high GDP per capita tend to attract more migrants from other continents.

Policy pointers

- Given that low income is consistently a cause of individuals having an unfavourable assessment of their society, boosting the income of the poorest people should have an impact on how they assess public services and access to health care, but also on levels of trust and feelings of economic tension.

- Training public officials to show more positive engagement with problems that low-income members of society have in dealing with public bureaucracies could improve their access and therefore their evaluation of the quality of public services.

- Increasing trust in public institutions requires reducing perceived corruption – a problem among some EU15 countries as well as the NMS12. Governments must strengthen anti-corruption policies and their enforcement in order to make procedures more transparent.
- Where neighbourhoods have sub-standard services, service providers should give priority to preventing further deterioration and to raising standards to the norm for the city or region as a whole.
- It is important for governments to deal with racial, ethnic and religious tensions by introducing policies that encourage migrants to develop a good understanding of national norms where they live. At the same time, governments should encourage all citizens to appreciate the positive features of economic and cultural integration.
- With an overall score of '6' on a 10-point index scale, the average European tends to rate the quality of public services positively, while indicating that more could be done to improve the quality of society. Combined with the scepticism expressed vis-à-vis political institutions, this result gives a clear message to policy makers to let words be followed by action.

Introduction

Although 'society' is an abstract concept, the public policies that contribute greatly to the quality of society are familiar features of daily life. They concern many different aspects of life, from educating young people to security of income and health in old age. Public policies are also responsible for maintaining the infrastructure of society, ensuring that water and air are not polluted, as well as reducing tensions between social groups that differ in their material or cultural circumstances. Because of governments' responsibility for providing such major social services, quality of society and of public services cannot be kept apart. In a modern society, the quality of individual life is not just a reflection of individual choices and behaviour. It is the sum of what is done by the state, the market, and individuals and their households (Rose, 1986).

The quality of society concerns how individuals and institutions relate to each other. Institutions influence the quality of society through collective actions that individuals cannot undertake by themselves – for example, maintaining schools, hospitals and roads. Assessing this goes beyond assessments of individual happiness, subjective well-being or individual prosperity (see, for example, Böhnke, 2005; Wallace et al, 2007; Alber et al, 2008). It is about the extent to which there is a sense of social cohesion and social solidarity within European countries.

However, no institution has a monopoly on the services that contribute to the quality of society. Important services affecting individuals and households are delivered locally – for instance, by teachers and nurses or by refuse collectors. The social partners are involved in the delivery of these services – that is, in their role as organised labour, employers and civil society institutions. National governments are not only responsible for financing many social services but also for the distribution of rights and responsibilities to all members of society. European Union (EU) institutions have the unique responsibility for promoting the quality of society across a continent with almost half a billion people. The EU's Renewed Social Agenda focuses on collective quality of society such as social inclusion, gender equality, and social solidarity and cohesion (European Commission, 2008).

The aim of advancing the quality of society in Europe today creates fresh challenges in an EU that brings together 27 different countries. It also means promoting social cohesion in societies that are becoming more diverse internally, as greater numbers of people take advantage of the EU's promotion of the right to work as well as travel across the Union. The financial crisis that started in 2008 raises fresh demands to prevent European societies from being divided between insiders who have not been immediately affected by the crisis and outsiders who have been. The EU's success in responding to these challenges is also important for its development, insofar as it depends for its legitimacy on its effectiveness in promoting the quality of European society (Scharpf, 1999; Majone, 2005). The concern of EU institutions goes beyond promoting policies for their own sake. A document of the Bureau of European Policy Advisers (Liddle and Lerais, 2007) emphasises:

> *Public policy imperatives such as 'growth and jobs', the Lisbon strategy and the drive for greater competitiveness are not ends in themselves – but means to an end – the well-being of European citizens.*

The European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound) has a clear stake in quality of society, because it brings together the major social partners – that is, employers, workers and the government – to bring forward proposals for advancing the quality of society on a Europe-wide scale. The European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS) has evolved as a major tool for providing ideas that address the issue of the quality of society from a distinctive perspective. Instead of evaluating what governments are doing, this Eurofound survey asks European citizens to evaluate

multiple aspects of quality in society. It uses the familiar and time-tested method of sample surveys that interview nationally representative cross-sections of the population in all 27 Member States of the European Union (EU27).

This report draws on the results of the 2007 EQLS in order to develop innovative indexes of the quality of societies and public services. It examines the multiple aspects of quality of society because statistical analysis shows that society cannot be reduced to a single index number, whether derived from public opinion surveys or economic data. The report's second objective is to identify the extent to which quality of society and public services vary between European nations. Since the EQLS results also show differences within every country, the report examines the extent to which differences in the evaluation of society reflect differences in individual income, gender or age. Consistent with the EU priority for social cohesion, the third objective of the report is to highlight policies that could increase social cohesion during challenging times in Europe.

Beyond monetary measures of quality of society

1

Gross domestic product (GDP) is the most frequently cited indicator of the quality of society. It combines different measures of economic activity in a single index number that is intended to describe a country's total economic activity in a particular year and indicate the extent to which the national economy has grown since the previous year. The calculation of GDP shows how easy or difficult it will be for a government to gain additional tax revenue to avoid a spending deficit. However, statistics of GDP per head of population or capita ignore the way in which incomes are distributed around a society's average income. Moreover, GDP cannot readily take into account less tangible goods that are not bought and sold in the marketplace, such as clean air or friendships. In principle, welfare economics have sought to relate public expenditure to the well-being of individuals in society. Nevertheless, instead of defining welfare in terms familiar in everyday life, it is characterised by the abstract concept of 'utility'. It thus risks becoming 'an uninterrupted stream of logical deductions which are not about anything at all' (Little, 1963, pp. 81ff).

Public expenditure data are often used to evaluate public policies for education, healthcare, social security and other aspects of quality of society. Such an approach assumes that if more money is spent on schools, health services or pensions, the services are necessarily better. However, it confuses inputs to meet the cost of producing public services – such as the wages of teachers, doctors or the police – with benefits that citizens may gain. In fact, there is no one-to-one correlation between the money spent on health services and national health or the money spent on policing and safety on the streets.

There is now a widespread recognition that in order to evaluate the quality of society, it is necessary to go beyond 'the measuring rod of money' (see Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2009; Stiglitz et al, 2009). In the succinct judgment of Amartya Sen, an advisor to the European Commission, he insists that: 'Economists and psychologists should try harder to understand what people think and how they act in real life' (quoted in Thornhill, 2009).

The social indicators movement was launched in the United States (US) to create statistics of 'direct normative interest which facilitate concise, comprehensive and balanced judgments about the conditions of major aspects of a society ... If it changes in the "right" direction, while other things remain equal, things have got better or people are better off' (US Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1969; see also Fahey et al, 2004, pp. 9ff). Typically, a social indicator is based on objective measures of individual characteristics – such as age, education, household size and housing, or economic status. The social indicators movement has stimulated national statistical offices to collate and add to social and demographic statistics, such as the British Social Trends statistics. The social element refers to the fact that these individual characteristics can be combined to describe the social structure of a society in quantitative terms. However, most of these indicators are not about relations between individuals in society.

In the past decade, attention has been given to the state of mind of individuals, 'where people's feelings are treated as paramount' (Layard, 2005). The chief areas of concern are happiness and life satisfaction, or the quality of life in general or in a variety of domains such as health, family or friends (see Böhnke, 2005; Huppert et al, 2005; Kahneman and Krueger, 2006; Phillips, 2006; Veenhoven and Hagerty, 2006). The New Economic Foundation in London (2008, pp. 2ff) argues that national GDP statistics 'have obscured other vital parts' of society, including the family, neighbourhood, community and biosphere. The Foundation has published a National Accounts of Well-being, using a large number of psychological indicators to assess 'how people feel and experience their lives'. Research on social capital, led by Robert Putnam (2000), has emphasised the importance for society of individuals trusting

each other. Moreover, the social cohesion programme of the Council of Europe (2009) is promoting measures of how people relate to each other in ways that minimise social exclusion and inequality.

In keeping with its mandate, at the beginning of this decade, Eurofound began a long-term programme of monitoring the quality of life. The initial concept paper interpreted the term broadly as follows: 'The quality of life in a society can be defined as the overall well-being of those living there'. The quality of life is conceived as reflecting both descriptive objective measures of individual conditions and subjective evaluations. The approach rejects the idea of a single summary measure of quality of life 'because it obscures more than it reveals' (Fahey et al, 2003, p. 14). Thus, the EQLS 'focuses broadly on quality of life rather than narrowly on living conditions – and sees quality of life primarily in terms of the scope that individuals have to achieve their own goals' (Anderson et al, 2009, p. 1). The first EQLS was conducted in 2003, with the advice of a team of European social scientists (see Fahey et al, 2004; Daly and Rose, 2007; Alber et al, 2008). The second survey, which is analysed in this report, was carried out by the research company TNS opinion, which conducted face-to-face interviews beginning in September 2007. In every EU Member State, a representative sample of a minimum of 1,000 adults were interviewed. In France, Germany, Italy, Poland and the United Kingdom (UK), there were between 1,500 and 2,000 respondents (for details of the sample and response rate, see Anderson et al, 2009, Annex 2).

Quality of society and public services are fundamental for the quality of life, but they are not identical. Whereas quality of life studies focus on subjective and objective conditions of individuals, a consideration of quality of society shifts the focus to collective institutions as well as characteristics of society and how individuals relate to them. For example, an individual who wants to be educated is not seeking to be self-taught but seeking a good school and university, and a person who needs an operation seeks a good hospital. The concept is thus oriented toward collective relationships between individuals and public sector and civil society organisations that deliver major services; at the same time, it focuses on relationships of trust or tension between major groups in society.

The EQLS adds value to official statistics because it goes beyond inferring quality of society from official statistics on the inputs and outputs of government. Instead, it looks at how these outputs are evaluated by their intended recipients. Because the EQLS is independent of national governments, it can ask people about aspects of their social life that could be the subject of public policies but that have yet to attract the attention of policymakers. The survey thus complements the Eurobarometer, which conducts surveys that address priority issues within the European Commission.[1] Although the EQLS and the European Social Survey (ESS) cover a similar set of countries, the latter concentrates on data primarily of concern to sociological research, such as class structure and media use. The World Values Survey covers more continents in its waves every five years, but its approach to public policy is to ask people what they would like the government to do rather than how they evaluate what the government actually does.

The EQLS provides insights into the lives of Europeans by collecting both objective and subjective data that go well beyond conventional socioeconomic measures.[2] Because the EQLS asks the same questions in each of 27 EU Member States, the results provide a benchmark – that is, the average view of the whole citizenry of Europe. The evaluation that citizens of any one country give can then be compared with the pan-European figure, in order to identify whether a country is above, near or below the average for the whole of Europe.

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1 See http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm

2 For the complete survey questionnaire, see http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/docs/areas/qualityoflife/eqlsquest03.pdf

Developing indexes to measure quality of society and public services

2

Although an 'information society' needs information, the production of data by governments threatens to make Europe an information-saturated society. To make sense of the flood of information, data needs to be condensed into meaningful pointers about public issues. An index is one such guide, clarifying what is happening by combining multiple bits of information into a single numerical scale.

In a complex world, policymakers are increasingly demanding indexes to help diagnose problems and target public policies; they are also being used more frequently by the media. Indexes do not inform governments what specific policies to adopt, but they do show where fresh action is needed to bring substandard conditions up to national standards. The open method of coordination enables EU policymakers to assess whether national conditions meet European standards for social cohesion.

The Consumer Price Index (CPI) of inflation is a familiar example of a policy-relevant index. The CPI does not indicate the price of anything in particular: instead, it shows how much a household's income needs to change to keep pace with inflation or, on the rare occasions when it is relevant, deflation. The CPI is a number, but it is not a fact – rather, it is a statistical construct. In order to create it, officials collect information about the purchasing habits of different types of households and incomes, and about prices for baskets of goods in shops in different parts of a particular country. The information is then combined in a single index. The result is not a 'price' as the term is understood in a supermarket. Nonetheless, its release each month produces a headline about how much or how little prices are changing.

Constructing indexes

The EQLS questionnaire (see footnote 2) covers major topics of importance to society and a number of questions are asked about each topic. For example, there are six questions about specific public services of central importance for the EU Social Agenda. The topics analysed in this report have been selected because they are particularly relevant to the activities of governments today. Other reports about the 2007 EQLS survey cover work–family balance, subjective well-being, social exclusion, and change and stability in society since the first EQLS four years previously.

Given the range of questions in the EQLS, a strategic choice must be made about how to combine them. If simplicity is the goal, then replies to all questions could be grouped together in a single index. However, combining indicators of public services, the neighbourhood environment, trust in politicians and tensions in society risks creating a 'pot-pourri' index of measures that are different in their causes and in the policy responses appropriate for improving them. Thus, to ensure clarity in the meaning of each index, the report proceeds on a step-by-step basis to ensure that each index is coherent and deals with similar issues.

The first step is to identify a set of questions that appear to be related in their relevance to a given concern of Europeans. Respondents from across the continent are pooled together in a single database and weighted in accordance with their country's share of Europe's population. The second step is to examine statistically whether individuals give similar answers to a group of questions. For instance, it is assessed whether people are negative about one type of public service, about all services or if they evaluate different services differently. Similarly, the survey examines whether people who perceive tensions between young and old persons also see tensions between women and men. Factor analysis is the appropriate statistical method to test the extent to which evaluations reflect a single underlying attitude suitable for combining in an index.

Method of analysis

Since an index score can be calculated for each respondent, this makes it possible to identify groups of citizens who are most and least positive about their society. The data can be used to test the hypothesis that who individuals are is of greatest importance in determining the perceived quality of the society in which they live. For example, people with more socioeconomic resources are generally more likely to have a positive view of society, while those who are low in resources and status will be least positive. Empirical analyses of European surveys show substantial support for this hypothesis (Alber et al, 2008; Kaase and Newton, 1995; Dalton, 2008).

Since public services depend on the actions of national government, a second hypothesis argues that where an individual lives is important for how they evaluate their society. Thus, people who live in countries with a high level of GDP per capita ought to be more satisfied with public services than those living in countries that are less well off economically. Similarly, those who live in countries where the government is corrupt ought to be less satisfied with what the government does. A substantial amount of empirical research exists indicating that quality of society will be higher where the distribution of income is more equal (see, for example, Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). Another hypothesis is cultural: differences between nations may reflect differences in the values of their citizens, as surmised in Huntington's (1996) thesis on the clash between a homogeneous 'Western' culture and an alien Islamic culture (see also Inglehart, 1997).

The two approaches can be combined in a third hypothesis: both who a person is and where they live are important influences on individual evaluations of the quality of their society. Taking into account differences in socioeconomic resources between individuals avoids the fallacy of assuming that everyone in a country thinks the same. Similarly, recognising differences between countries avoids the individualist fallacy of assuming that each person evaluates his or her society without regard to their national context (Robinson, 1950; Scheuch, 1966). In a survey in a single country, it is not possible to test the effect of cross-national differences. Since the EQLS provides data about citizens in every EU country, however, it is possible to test the effects of both individual and national differences.

Consecutive chapters in this report develop indexes for evaluating the quality of public services and of the local environment, along with access to health services, trust in political institutions and in people, and tensions in society. Each chapter starts by reporting the answers to each question used to compile the index, and demonstrating its statistical validity. The second step is to describe the degree to which index scores differ between countries and between individuals according to their income, age, gender and education. Since social characteristics are often interrelated – for example, income and education – multivariate statistical analysis is then used to identify the specific social characteristics that have the greatest effect on individuals, after controlling for their other attributes. In addition, multilevel statistical modelling (see, for example, Steenbergen and Jones, 2002; Luke, 2004) is then used to test the combined impact of differences in the national context and the socioeconomic differences of individuals.

Public services 3

In today's Europe, every government is responsible for delivering a range of public services, and people spend far more time consuming outputs of government than they devote to inputting their views at election time. Services that are publicly authorised and financed can be delivered by public employees in state, regional or local government. They can also be delivered by public and civil society institutions such as universities, or by private sector organisations. Before the global economic crisis of 2008, public expenditure in the average EU country amounted to 43% of GDP, while taxation was equal to 40% of GDP.

A small number of public services have a large impact on households and individuals throughout their lives. Completing more than 10 years of education is now the norm, as is drawing a pension for a decade or longer in retirement. Healthcare is relevant throughout the lifecycle. Care for pre-school children predominantly affects younger families, while care for elderly persons impacts on older households. The quality of public transport is important not only to those who use it regularly, but also to those who use a car because public transport is deemed inadequate. At any given time, the average European household is likely to be directly benefiting from at least two of these major public services, while those employed by public institutions and public authorities constitute one quarter of the labour force.

Public Services Index

The EQLS asked respondents to rate six familiar types of public services: health services, the education system, pensions, public transport, childcare services and care for elderly persons. On a 10-point scale, with 1 denoting the lowest rating and 10 the highest, the average score for four services – namely, public transport, the education system, health services and childcare services – was positive (Figure 1). However, individual judgments varied substantially around these averages. A total of 67% of respondents gave a positive rating of '6' or more for public transport; 66% were positive about the education system and health services; and 61% were positive about childcare services. Services for older people were nevertheless assessed less favourably. The average rating of care services for elderly persons stood at the arithmetic midpoint of the scale (5.5), while it was negative for the pension system, which only less than one third of the respondents rated positively (Figure 1). Nonetheless, after controlling for the fact that up to one sixth of respondents evaluated services at the psychological midpoint of the scale (5), those describing a service as low in quality were a limited minority.

Since the average ratings for each type of public service are rather similar, this suggests that individuals tend to have largely the same opinion about each service rather than discriminating sharply between them. This could reflect the fact that a government that either successfully or unsuccessfully delivers one service will perform similarly in relation to the other services. It could also indicate people's tendency to express a generalised opinion about the government serving the public interest or being wasteful and inefficient. Insofar as individual assessments of public services tend to follow the same pattern, the scores for individual services can be combined into a Public Service Index.

To determine whether popular responses reflect a single underlying attitude, a factor analysis was undertaken of individual ratings for six types of services (see Annex Table A2). Europeans who express a positive attitude towards one type of service are more likely to express a positive opinion about all of the other services as well. Conversely, those who are critical of any one service are disposed to be critical of others. The six types of services under examination constitute a single principal component with a high degree of commonality. To test the robustness of this Public Services Index, separate analyses were conducted with the same questions asked in the 2003 EQLS and for respondents in the

15 EU Member States (EU15) prior to enlargement in 2004 and the new Member States (NMS) in the 2007 EQLS. The results are almost identical and justify the creation of a Public Service Index.

Figure 1: Average European evaluation of public services, by type of service



Notes: Figures show average value on a 10-point scale; figures in parentheses show standard deviation. Results are based on responses to Question 56: 'In general, how would you rate the quality of each of the following public services in your country on a scale from one (very poor quality) to 10 (very high quality)?'
The results are weighted by population.
Source: EQLS 2007

The Public Service Index adds every individual's numerical rating of each public service and divides the total by the number of services rated (Figure 2). This controls for 'don't know' replies, which ranged from 1% for health services, 5% for public transport and education, to 13% for pensions, 20% for care services for elderly people and 24% for childcare. The relatively large number of 'don't knows' for the latter groups reflects their age-specific relevance.

Figure 2: Distribution of ratings in Public Services Index



Notes: Mean = 5.9; standard deviation = 1.6; sample comprises 31,390 cases.
Results are based on a 10-point scale, where 1 = 'very poor quality' and 10 = 'very high quality', in response to Question 56. The index gives each individual's average response to the six public service questions after the exclusion of 'don't know' answers. Individual averages are rounded down to the nearest 0.5 in the figure above.
Source: EQLS 2007

The median respondent is positive about public services. Overall, 57% of the respondents have an index score above the arithmetic midpoint of 5.5. Only 22% show a score which is a point or more below the midpoint. However, the spread of evaluations is wide.

Differences in individuals' evaluation of society

Within every European society, differences in resources such as income, education, gender and age tend to be associated with differences in how individuals evaluate their society (Alber et al, 2008). Figure 3 shows the extent to which individual characteristics affect how people evaluate public services. It compares the scores on the Public Service Index of Europeans with higher socioeconomic resources and those with lower resources.

Due to problems arising in getting people to reveal their income to survey interviewers[3], the EQLS offers another measure of financial resources by asking each respondent to say how easy or difficult it is for their household 'to make ends meet'. Only 1% were unwilling to give a reply.

Figure 3: Individual resources and Public Services Index



Note: Figures show average score on the Public Services Index according to the following individual characteristics: adequate income, third-level education, age and gender. Results are based on a 10-point scale, where 1 = 'very poor quality' and 10 = 'very high quality'.
Source: EQLS 2007

A total of 62% of respondents report that their income is adequate to meet their expenditure, including 9% who can very easily make ends meet, 24% who easily do so and 29% who are able to do so fairly easily. On the other hand, 5% of respondents have a small degree of difficulty in making ends meet, 9% report more difficulty and 3% cite great difficulty. As expected, there is a difference of 0.7 of a point in the rating of public services between those who say their income is adequate and those who say it is not (Figure 3). The marginal nature of the difference is reflected in the fact that a positive rating is given to public services by a majority of respondents in both groups.

Education is an important resource, because it not only tends to raise income levels but also provides skills useful for obtaining public services – for example, filling out forms and urging teachers and

[3] In response to the EQLS question about household income, 38% of respondents did not give a reply and there were great variations between countries in the respondents' willingness to do so. In Sweden, for example, 9% of respondents did not state their income, while 68% refused to do so in Italy.

doctors to give better care. Having a third-level education – that is, attending a university, polytechnic or similar post-secondary institution – seems to be a significant factor in making use of public services and 28% of the EQLS respondents have a third-level education. As expected, people in this category tend to be more positive in evaluating public services; however, the difference in index scores compared with those with less education is only 0.3 of a point on the 10-point scale.

Differences are also evident in relation to age and respondents' evaluation of public services. Older people are more likely to have immediate concerns about a pension, health services and home care, while younger people are more likely to be concerned with education and childcare. Older people may also be better at claiming public services because of having greater experience in dealing with bureaucratic institutions and, regarding those who are retired, having more time to make claims. Moreover, younger people may assess public services against an ideal standard, while older people may judge them in comparison to services that were in place a quarter or half century ago. Nonetheless, there is only an insignificant 0.1 point difference between the average rating of public services given by those under 30 years of age and those aged 65 years or older.

From a gender perspective, women are more directly involved than men in public services, being more likely to work in the health services and education and more often observing how their children are treated by these services. Feminists offer the view that women, even when having equal legal rights with men, will be less favoured by public services. This is clearly the case in the allocation of seats in parliaments where policy decisions are endorsed. However, no difference is evident between men and women in their evaluation of public services, with both sexes showing the same average score of 5.9.

While it could be expected that how people evaluate age-specific services reflects where they are in their lifecycle, the average rating of the quality of education services among those with children (6.3) is virtually the same as that for those without children (6.2). Similarly, the average evaluation of parents in relation to childcare services (6.2) is similar to that of those who do not have children (6.0). Pensions, care for elderly persons and healthcare are three public services that are particularly relevant to older people. The EQLS finds that people aged 65 years or older, who are more likely to use these services, are also more positive about such facilities. For example, the average rating among older people regarding the state pension is higher (5.2) compared with the average score for those below the age of 65 years (4.7). Similarly, the evaluation of care for elderly persons among those aged 65 years and over is slightly higher (5.8) than the average score for those below that age (5.5). Among persons over 65 years of age, for whom healthcare services can literally be a matter of life or death, the average rating of health services is also slightly higher (6.4) that the score for those aged 18–64 years (6.1). In short, the social group most likely to have up-to-date experience of specific public services tends to give a higher rating for such services.

Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression is an appropriate statistic for identifying which individual resources are significant for satisfaction with public services. The results reported in Annex Table A3 show that people with an adequate income are more satisfied with public services. Age, education and living in an urban area are also statistically significant, although their effects are small. No significant relationship is evident between gender and how citizens perceive the quality of their public services.

Cross-country comparison

The EU Member States differ in their national histories: some are long established democracies, while others were part of the Soviet-dominated Communist bloc until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.

Differences are also evident in economic resources between northern and southern Europe, as well as between western and eastern Europe. The length of time that countries have been EU members varies between the EU15 countries, which include six founding members of the EU, and the 12 NMS countries that joined the EU in either 2004 or 2007.

Citizens in the EU15 countries consistently tend to give a higher rating for each public service (see Annex Table A4). For education and childcare, the average scores of the NMS are not significantly lower than the rating for the EU15 counties. However, for public transport, the score in the NMS is slightly lower (6.1) than the average rating in the EU15 countries (6.4). The same is true in relation to care for elderly people (at 5.0 in the NMS compared with 5.7 in the EU15), as well as with regard to state pensions (at 4.2 compared with 5.0 in the NMS and EU15 respectively).

Differences between countries are reflected in the overall Public Service Index score (Figure 4). Two thirds of countries are above the midpoint index score (5.5). Only Bulgaria and Greece are below the psychological midpoint (5). On the 10-point Public Services Index, there is only half a point's difference in the average of the EU15 countries and the NMS. The distance between the highest ranking country, Finland (7.5), and the lowest, Bulgaria (4.5), is large. However, some degree of overlap is also evident between the EU15 and the NMS: respondents in 11 out of the 12 NMS countries give their public services a higher rating than people living in Greece and Portugal do.

Figure 4: Average Public Services Index score, by country



Note: Index gives each individual's average response to the six public service questions after exclusion of 'don't know' answers. Responses are based on a 10-point scale, where 1 = 'very poor quality' and 10 = 'very high quality'.
Source: EQLS 2007

Comparing European societies by the country name emphasises their national distinctiveness, whereas doing so by generic attributes such as GDP differentiates countries according to a common measure. This turns differences of kind into differences in degree. Within the EU, differences in GDP per capita are substantial. Even after adjusting for purchasing power differences, at the time of the 2007 EQLS the range was between €9,300 in Bulgaria and €37,400 in Ireland, and higher still in the unusual circumstances of Luxembourg. However, the wealth of a country is not the only determinant of investment in public services: equally important is the percentage of GDP that is allocated to public expenditure.

It could be expected that the higher the proportion of GDP expenditure on public services, the greater the level of popular satisfaction on the Public Services Index. However, Figure 5 shows that this is not the case and that there is no significant association between the two. Instead of a straight line correlation, many countries are higher on one indicator and lower on the other. For example, Hungary is well above the European average in public expenditure as a percentage of GDP, but its Public Service Index is below the EU average. Conversely, Estonia and Spain are relatively low in their level of public expenditure but their Public Service Index scores are relatively high. This implies that how a government spends money on public services may be as important as how much it spends.

Figure 5: Relationship between public expenditure and quality of public services, by country



Notes: The Public Services Index reflects the aggregated average scores for each of the EU27 Member States, based on a 10-point scale where 1 = 'very poor quality' and 10 = 'very high quality'. Public expenditure is calculated as a percentage of GDP in 2007. Correlation (r) = .30
Sources: EQLS 2007; Eurostat, 2009 and government finance statistics

Combining individual and national influences

The perception of government corruption in a country may reduce satisfaction with public services among citizens who think that these services are being run for private benefit. Transparency International[4] annually compiles a Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), rating all 27 EU Member States on a scale from 0 (perceived highly corrupt) to 10 (perceived to have low levels of corruption). At the time of the second EQLS, the countries ranking highest on the 10-point CPI were Denmark and Finland (9.4),

[4] See http://www.transparency.org

while those ranking lowest were Romania (3.7) and Bulgaria (4.2). One of the EU15 Member States, Greece, ranked lower on the CPI than nine of the NMS countries. Moreover, how national income is distributed among the population can also affect popular attitudes (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). The Gini Index of Income Inequality is internationally recognised as a measure of income distribution. On a scale ranging from 0 (absolute equality) to 100 (absolute inequality), the average Gini Index for the EU Member States at 29 tends towards the objective of income equality. Among the EQLS countries, the Gini Index ranges from 38 in Portugal to 22 in Sweden.

The breadth of the EQLS questionnaire makes it possible to test a variety of individual attributes and attitudes that in theory might influence how people evaluate public services. However, many measures included in a statistical analysis could prove to be lacking in substantive or statistical significance; such measures have been screened out in preliminary OLS regression analyses using dozens of independent variables. The multilevel modelling analyses in this chapter, and subsequent chapters, focus on those influences that have a notable impact on an index or that are important to include as they fail to have the expected impact. If indicators of national context are highly correlated with each other, then to avoid multicollinearity and unreliable results, only one indicator can be included in the multilevel modelling analysis (Steenbergen and Jones, 2002; Luke, 2004). GDP per capita correlates strongly with the Transparency International CPI (r: 0.85) and with being an indicator of the national context of the EU15 Member States. The CPI is used here since it is a direct measure of the quality of public services. As the Gini Index of Income Inequality does not correlate with the Transparency International index of perceived corruption, it too can be used to assess the effect of national context.[5]

The multilevel model confirms the need to take both individual and national differences into account, because it can explain much more of the variation in the evaluation of public services than national comparisons or simple correlations between four socioeconomic attributes can[6] (compare Annex Tables A3 and A5). Controlling for the effect of a host of influences shows that some influences which might, on a priori grounds, be considered important – such as whether a person lives in an urban or rural setting – fail to achieve statistical significance. Moreover, the impact of the seven statistically significant influences varies substantially in scale and direction.[7]

The extent to which a national government delivers services transparently or corruptly has the biggest impact on the quality of public services (Figure 6). In countries where public officials act in a bureaucratic way – that is, delivering education, health services, pensions and other services according to the rules – the Public Services Index increases by 1.31 points, compared with the countries where a substantial degree of corruption is reported. If people receive public services without any expectation of the need to pay 'gratitude money', they ought to be more satisfied with their public services. Even if individuals are not subject to extortion, the fact that the media and informal conversations refer to corruption will diminish popular evaluations (Mishler and Rose, 1997).

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[5] When the multilevel model analyses reported here were re-run replacing the Transparency International CPI with national GDP per capita, the effect of GDP consistently appeared to be insignificant or less significant than that of the CPI.

[6] For statistical reasons, when analysing survey data, the amount of variance explained between individuals (R^2) appears lower than the same figure calculated for aggregates such as countries. As a general rule of thumb, as the value of R^2 rises above 10%, the impact is increasingly substantial; as it falls below 10%, the influence is lower.

[7] The impact of a significant variable is calculated by multiplying its unstandardised b coefficient (see Annex Table A5) by the difference between its highest and lowest numerical value as reported in Annex Table A1. For a dichotomous independent variable, such as gender, the impact and the b coefficient are the same. For a variable with a range of values – for example, between 0 and 6 for the degree of deprivation in a household – the impact is calculated by multiplying the b coefficient of -0.049 by 6.

Figure 6: Major influences on Public Services Index, by multilevel model



Note: Variance accounted for: (pseudo R^2) = 19.4%.
Source: Calculated from the multilevel model reported in Annex Table A5

Whereas pervasive inequities in public administration reduce the quality of public services, the Gini Index of Income Inequality fails to have any statistical significance (see Annex Table A5). As far as the evaluation of public services is concerned, equity in public administration is significantly more important than equality in income distribution. The limited influence of GDP is confirmed by a more fine-grained measure, the regional level of economic development, which fails to have a statistically significant impact. After controlling for all other influences, people who live in poor regions are just as likely to be positive about public services as those who live in the most prosperous regions; the same is also true for rural and urban dwellers (see Annex Table A5).

Individual resources are also significant, the most important ones being economic resources. The more adequate a household's income is, the more likely people are to be positive about public services. For instance, people who can easily buy what they need rate public services at 1.12 points higher than those who have major economic difficulties. Moreover, insofar as an inadequate income leads to deprivation of food, clothing or other necessities (see Anderson et al, 2009, pp. 8ff), this further diminishes evaluations of public services. Thus, even where public services are transparently administered, people who are economically well off are more satisfied with public services. Their status may secure better treatment within the rules, while those who are worst off financially are treated fairly but may sometimes be treated peremptorily.

It could be expected that people who are more politically and socially integrated in their society would be able to use their social capital to garner better treatment from public officials. Insofar as this is the case, people who are more educated and have more political contacts ought to be more positive about public services. However, the opposite is the case. Persons with a third-level education give public services a lower rating than those with less education. Similarly, those who have the most political contacts assign public services a lower rating than those who have no such contacts. This surprising finding could be related to the fact that those with more education and political involvement may have higher expectations of what public services should be like. This interpretation is complemented by the finding that those who regularly attend church give public services a more charitable – that is, positive – rating. After controlling for other socioeconomic characteristics, older people – who depend on a variety of public services – do not differ significantly from younger people on the Public Services Index. Moreover, no significant difference is evident between the evaluations of men and women.

The increased mobility of people in today's EU has resulted in a changing population in many countries, with a greater mixture of longstanding citizens, migrants and those with immigrant parents. In the EQLS, some 87% of respondents reported that both parents and they themselves were natives of the country. Even though long-established citizens would be expected to have more advantages in claiming public services, they are not more positive about such services: instead, after controlling for all other characteristics, they tend to view public services a little less favourably than the 13% of respondents who are, or whose parent was, a migrant from another country or continent.

Overall, nevertheless, most Europeans have a positive view of the quality of their public services. While few are so uncritical as to rate services at the top of a 10-point scale, those who are positive are in the majority and substantially outnumber people who are consistently negative. Moreover, the average citizen is positive about public services in a large majority of EU Member States. Within this broadly favourable picture, however, there are some negative findings – most significantly, in relation to the ratings of pensions and of care for elderly persons. Since this view tends to be held across all age groups in the European countries, it is not simply a reflection of the dissatisfaction expressed by an interest group comprising only old people.

Local environment and crime 4

Neighbourhoods are face-to-face communities. People do not need to turn on the television to see what is happening in their neighbourhood; they can find out by walking outside their home to observe the effect of public services on the local environment. Notwithstanding the importance for each household of clean air and water, in modern societies individuals cannot provide these services for themselves. They are collective environmental services for which public institutions are responsible. The principle of subsidiarity assigns responsibilities for these services to multiple levels of government. The EU is responsible for policies that can directly affect the quality of the environment, and living and working conditions – responsibilities that are often shared with national governments. However, local government and local providers are responsible for delivering many services, such as safety on the streets and access to green spaces that contribute greatly to well-being in the neighbourhood in which people spend their daily lives.

Index of neighbourhood environment services

The EQLS questionnaire asks participants to indicate whether or not they have reasons to complain about the standard of services that affect where they live – that is, the immediate neighbourhood of their home. As local services are on their doorstep, people are particularly well qualified to judge them. The six topics covered are as follows: noise, air pollution, access to recreational or green areas, water quality, crime, violence or vandalism, and litter or rubbish on the street. The degree of satisfaction or dissatisfaction is measured on a 4-point scale, ranging from 'very many reasons to complain' (1) to 'no reason at all to complain' (4).

Even though the phrasing of the question explicitly refers to complaints, across the EU an absolute majority of respondents indicate that they have no reason at all to complain about the different elements of the local environment in their neighbourhood. A total of 66% of respondents had no complaints about access to green areas, 65% had no problem with water, 56% cited no complaints about noise or about air pollution, 53% had no concerns about crime, while 52% had no complaint about litter. Less than one fifth of the respondents expressed many or very many complaints about any aspect of the environment. Hence, the average rating for each neighbourhood characteristic is very positive: on a 4-point scale, Europeans rate each aspect at either 3.3 or 3.4 (Figure 7).

Figure 7: Evaluation of neighbourhood quality, by type of service



Notes: Results are based on responses to Question 54: 'Please think about the area where you live now – I mean the immediate neighbourhood of your home. Do you have very many reasons, many reasons, a few reasons, or no reason at all to complain about each of the following problems?'
Responses are given on a 4-point scale, where 4 = 'no reason to complain' and 1 = 'very many reasons to complain'.
Source: EQLS 2007

The similarity of evaluations for each environmental measure implies that individual judgments reflect an overall pattern, and a factor analysis confirms that all six measures can be combined into a single Neighbourhood Services Index. There is a single principal component: the loadings for each item are between 0.64 and 0.80, reflecting a high degree of commonality (see Annex Table A2). Separate factor analyses for the EU15 countries and the NMS show similar results, and the same holds true for neighbourhood quality covered in the 2003 as well as the 2007 EQLS.

The Neighbourhood Services Index adds each individual's rating of each public service and divides the total by the number of services rated – this controls for 'don't know' replies, which were consistently 1% or less, except in relation to tap water (1.2%). In turn, it produces an index score that can range from 4.0 for a person with no complaints about any of the services to 1.0 for a person who has many complaints about all of these services. The largest group (42% of respondents) completely endorse their neighbourhood, with no reason to complain about any aspects of the local environment. The median respondent's score falls between having no reason to complain and a few reasons to complain. However, agreement is not complete among Europe's citizens: one in six of the respondents usually finds at least a few reasons to complain, while a small proportion have many reasons to complain about their local environment.

Individual resources and neighbourhood quality

Of four major socioeconomic characteristics, economic circumstances have the biggest impact: people who can meet their monthly expenditure without difficulty have fewer complaints about the quality of their neighbourhood services. The average score for those with an adequate income is 3.5, while the score for people having problems in making ends meet is slightly lower at 3.2. People who live in rural areas are also more likely to be satisfied with the services provided in their local environment (Figure 8). While statistically significant, these differences are in degree, not in kind. Similarly, in terms of crime, those who are better off are more likely to say that they have no complaint about crime in their neighbourhood (89%) than those who have economic difficulties (80%), while those who live in cities rather than rural areas are more likely to complain about crime. Educated people are no more likely to

Figure 8: Relationship between individual resources and Neighbourhood Services Index



Note: The Neighbourhood Services Index gives each individual's average response to six neighbourhood questions, based on a 4-point scale, where 4 = 'no reason to complain' and 1 = 'very many reasons to complain'.
Source: EQLS 2007

be satisfied by the quality of their neighbourhood than those without a third-level education; the same is true regarding the evaluation of crime.

Age is also associated with satisfaction with the local neighbourhood (Figure 8). Older people are slightly more satisfied with their neighbourhood, perhaps because they have had more time to buy a home of their choice in a place of their choice. The difference may also reflect older people's readiness to become accustomed to their surroundings and accept them. However, the difference is slight, at only 0.2 of a point on the Neighbourhood Services Index. Similarly, the age difference is only 0.1 of a point in relation to crime.

Women are likely to spend more time in their local neighbourhood than men for the following reasons: fewer women participate in the labour market, women spend more time looking after the local activities of children, and women live longer than men. Nonetheless, greater familiarity with the local neighbourhood, and other differences associated with gender, do not affect the assessments: the average score for women and men is the same (3.4) on the Neighbourhood Services Index (Figure 8).

To control for the association between socioeconomic characteristics, five potential influences were included in a multiple regression analysis calculating their effect on the Neighbourhood Services Index. This found that people who live in urban areas are more likely to make some complaints about neighbourhood services than people who live in rural areas. Household income also has a significant influence on neighbourhood evaluations, while age and education have less influence on neighbourhood satisfaction. Altogether, these socioeconomic influences accounted for 11.5% of the variation in satisfaction with neighbourhood services. A similar regression about complaints concerning crime also found that urban residence was a major cause of dissatisfaction; however, this could be offset to some extent by those with a higher income living in neighbourhoods where local services gave fewer reasons to complain about crime (Annex Table A3).

Cross-country comparison

When countries are compared on the Neighbourhood Services Index, there is a tendency for countries to group together near the top of the scale, with the overall average standing at 3.4 on the 4-point scale. In the EU15 countries and the NMS, the average scores are close, being only –0.2 of a point apart; this also holds true for crime. A few countries stand out from the average. In Denmark and Finland, the overall index score is only 0.2 of a point from total satisfaction with services. On the other hand, in Bulgaria and Italy, the average index score is a full point below the top rating (Figure 9).

Four decades of rapid industrialisation that has lacked regard for environmental concerns has left a mark on neighbourhoods in 10 EU Member States that were once part of the Communist bloc. In these countries, a majority of respondents voice at least a few complaints regarding litter, crime, water quality, noise and air pollution. However, only a small minority have a large number of complaints about these services. In the EU15, a consistent majority of respondents say they have no complaints – nonetheless, the minority voicing concerns is also substantial. Thus, the difference between the two groups of countries is not that large overall. The gap is only eight percentage points for complaints about crime, because crime is a concern in the EU15 as well as in the NMS.

Given the cost of providing public services to keep neighbourhoods free of pollution and provide green spaces, it would be expected that the higher the percentage of GDP expenditure on public services in a country, the better the quality of neighbourhood services. However, there is no significant association between public expenditure and a country's average score on the neighbourhood index (r: 0.23). With

Figure 9: Average scores on Neighbourhood Services Index, by country



Note: The Neighbourhood Services Index gives each individual's average response to six neighbourhood questions, based on a 4-point scale, where 4 = 'no reason to complain' and 1 = 'very many reasons to complain'.
Source: EQLS 2007

regard to crime, a negative and insignificant correlation of -0.25 emerges between a country's GDP expenditure and the perception of crime in a neighbourhood.

Combining individual and national influences

The same multilevel statistical methods are used as before to identify what accounts for differences in the way in which individuals evaluate their neighbourhood with one addition: an index of the extent to which people complain about their housing. This index is composed of answers to six EQLS questions about shortage of space, structural faults and related problems in respondents' accommodation. Since people are as satisfied with their housing as they are with their neighbourhood, it is possible that they project these feelings onto their evaluation of the local environment.[8] The multilevel models confirm that both individual and national characteristics influence people's evaluation of neighbourhood quality (Figure 10).

Where people live has a big effect on how they evaluate their local environment. In particular, the effects of differences within a country and between neighbourhoods within an urban area have a

[8] To verify that there were not a number of factors affecting neighbourhood quality that did not influence national public services, additional regressions were conducted with many potentially important influences. Since they were of little or no significance, they are not included in the final analysis reported here.

substantial impact. Although urban areas have economies of scale compared with rural areas, in urban areas the 4-point Neighbourhood Services Index is more than a quarter of a point lower. This rating appears to reflect the scale of the challenge confronting urban governments. For example, even though police forces are larger and have more sophisticated equipment in urban areas, they also face more crime.

Figure 10: Multilevel model of influences on views of neighbourhood services



Notes: Variance accounted for: (pseudo R^2) = 20.4%.
The Neighbourhood Services Index shows the average response to six neighbourhood questions. Female gender has an impact of -.02 (not shown in the figure).
Source: Calculated from multilevel model reported in Annex Table A6

Within an urban area, neighbourhoods differ between those that are stable and those that are in transition because of the opening up of national societies to people migrating from other countries or continents. When the EQLS asked respondents to characterise their local neighbourhood, some 53% indicated that hardly anyone is of a race or ethnic group different from the majority of people in their country. A further one third stated that some people are different, while 11% reported that many people in their neighbourhood differ in race or ethnicity from the majority of citizens in the country. The reference to race and ethnicity indicates that mixed neighbourhoods are likely to have immigrants from other continents, such as North Africa or Pakistan, more than transnational migrants from within the EU or Roma in the NMS. People living in a racially or ethnically mixed neighbourhood give a Neighbourhood Services Index rating of more than one quarter of a point lower. These views are not greatly affected by whether people are long-term residents whose parents along with themselves are born in the country. Tensions appear to be generated by changes in a neighbourhood due to people moving in who are not the same as residents' former neighbours. If openness to newcomers is due to the neighbourhood having previously been disadvantaged in the quality of its services, this is an additional source of complaint.

After controlling for all other characteristics, the condition of a person's house has an impact on how they rate their neighbourhood. The EQLS collects six different indicators of the conditions of a respondent's house – for example, whether there is a shortage of space, problems with dampness and lack of a toilet. Up to a point, these conditions are integral to the accommodation itself. On the other hand, households can take the initiative to improve the conditions in which they live, either through do-it-yourself (DIY) work on a house with poor conditions or by moving elsewhere. Not surprisingly, the very small percentage of Europeans who find themselves in poor housing are less likely to give their neighbourhood a positive rating (Figure 10).

The economic conditions of a neighbourhood, particularly in an urban area, cannot be separated from the region of which it is a part. The allocation of structural funds to regions is a major activity of the EU. The EQLS classifies regions by the extent to which their GDP per capita is above, at or below the EU average. As local labour markets and economic opportunities differ within as well as between countries, these factors have the potential to offer a more finely-grained description of an individual's economic context than the national GDP. However, the multilevel model analysis finds that regional economic conditions do not have a significant influence on quality of the local environment. In other words, there is no significant risk that regional prosperity or depression affect the individual evaluations of people's neighbourhood. Since there are many diverse neighbourhoods within a region, to be effective in improving neighbourhood conditions policies must be targeted at narrowly defined neighbourhoods within cities as well as at the larger compass of a region.

The indirect effects that EU and national institutions have on neighbourhood quality through policies delivered at the local level by local authorities and social partners include the degree of integrity at the national level. In countries where the integrity of national government is highest on the Transparency International CPI, the Neighbourhood Services Index is a full half point higher. In as much as citizens tend to judge the integrity of government without regard to distinctions between national and local behaviour, this implies that corruption, whatever the level, increases the complaints that people make about how government provides neighbourhood services. Moreover, those who have more political contacts – and who should thus be more knowledgeable about public services – tend to have more complaints about their neighbourhood (Figure 10).

Income and age are the individual resources that have an impact on how people evaluate their neighbourhood. Unsurprisingly, the more adequate a person's income is, the more likely they are to be positive about their neighbourhood (Figure 10). Similarly, older people also tend to be more positive about their local services. However, the impact of each is less than that of urban conditions generally and of living in a neighbourhood that is very mixed ethnically and racially.

For each measure of the quality of the neighbourhood environment, citizens tend to be positive: the average European has no complaints about rubbish collection, air and noise pollution, access to recreation and green areas, or crime. However, within each country, there are some neighbourhoods where many residents have complaints about local services. Since these services are delivered to neighbourhoods that can readily be mapped, improving neighbourhood services involves targeting places rather than people, as is the case with pensions or health services.

The multilevel analysis shows that even though problems are associated with cities, they are not distributed evenly throughout a metropolitan area: they are found in some of its neighbourhoods but not in others. Complaints are significantly fewer in neighbourhoods that are ethnically homogeneous. Such neighbourhoods are likely to have settled populations, where people know and can cooperate with each other and where public agencies have established routines to maintain neighbourhood standards (Putnam, 2007; see also American Political Science Association Organized Section in Comparative Politics (APSA-CP), 2009). The higher level of complaints in ethnically heterogeneous neighbourhoods does not appear to be due to 'nativism' or racism, since people who are not long-term citizens of a country are almost as likely to complain about neighbourhood services as those who are. This suggests that providers of neighbourhood services tend to give lower quality services to neighbourhoods that are becoming multi-ethnic. In addition, people living in countries where the government tends to be corrupt rather than transparent have substantially more complaints about their neighbourhood environment.

Access to health services 5

The health of individuals reflects their social environment as well as their biological age (World Health Organization (WHO), 2008). Every EU Member State maintains a national health service that is, along with social security, the largest and fastest growing claimant on tax revenues. Moreover, 5% or more of each country's workforce is directly or indirectly employed in providing health services. WHO (2008) has documented substantial social inequalities in health within as well as between countries (see Anderson et al, 2009, Chapter 6). For this reason, the health strategy of the European Commission (2007) makes the reduction in health inequalities a priority. The EQLS allows for analysis of the extent to which there are also substantial inequalities in access to health services.

Index of access to health services

No one can be sure when they will need to see a doctor or require hospital treatment; but even people who do not make use of health services for some years gain a sense of security in knowing that services are at hand whenever their health requires it. However, there are legal, economic, practical and psychological obstacles to receiving treatment.

Legislation establishing a national health service sets out conditions of eligibility and, conversely, exclusion. Individuals or their employer may be required to pay a monthly contribution for health insurance or face long waits for means-tested treatment. Many national programmes ask health service users to pay for a proportion of their treatment; charges can thus discourage poorer users. Distance from a doctor's office or a hospital can be another obstacle to access. Difficulties in seeing a doctor at a time that does not conflict with people's hours of employment can be a further hindrance. Among other barriers to care, people may be hesitant about consulting a doctor because they feel socially inadequate in the presence of medical professionals.

The EQLS asked respondents four questions about obstacles to getting treatment that they might have experienced when they last needed to see a doctor. The questions relate to cost, the distance to travel for treatment, problems of getting an appointment and waiting in a medical office. For half to almost three quarters of Europeans, their national health service provided ready access (Table 1). The fact that 73% of the respondents do not consider distance as an obstacle shows that the health service, like the post office, is a nationwide service. The lower majorities of responses for getting an appointment and being seen by a doctor reflect the reality that queuing is a consequence of high demand for treatment in relation to the facilities available. The constraints of time are more of an obstacle than a shortage of money, as those who view charges for treatment as a problem are significantly fewer than the minority who consider the time taken to be treated as a difficulty. Insofar as people do perceive obstacles, they are usually described as causing a little rather than a lot of difficulty (Table 1). Only 5% of respondents

Table 1: Evaluation of access to health services

	Very difficult (%)	A little difficult (%)	No difficultly (%)	Average	Standard deviation
Distance	5	22	73	2.7	0.6
Cost of seeing a doctor	9	23	68	2.6	0.7
Difficult to get an appointment	13	29	58	2.5	0.7
Waiting time to see doctor	13	33	54	2.4	0.7

Notes: Results are based on responses to Question 47: 'On the last occasion you needed to see a doctor or medical specialist, to what extent did each of the following factors make it difficult for you to do so?' (1 = 'very difficult'; 2 = 'some difficulty'; 3 = 'no difficulty')
Those who replied 'don't know' or who did not need to see a doctor were excluded.
Source: EQLS 2007

cited distance as a significant difficulty, while 9% viewed cost as a big obstacle and 13% found that getting an appointment or waiting in a medical office made treatment very difficult. The 9% who did not answer these questions because they had not seen a doctor for a long time were excluded from the calculations in this chapter.

Each individual tends to make largely the same judgment about each of the steps involved in getting healthcare. A factor analysis identifies a single principal component in which individual replies for all four steps score very highly (see Annex Table A2). Factor analyses in the EU15 and NMS reach the same conclusion. Moreover, the commonality in attitudes is found to be consistent in a factor analysis of the same questions in the 2003 EQLS. Since individuals tend to evaluate access to health services similarly, an Access to Health Services Index can be created by assigning each alternative a numerical score – that is, 1 for 'very difficult', 2 for 'some difficulty' and 3 for 'no difficulty'; the scores are then added and divided by the number of questions answered.

According to the results, health services seem to be readily available to a substantial majority of the population: 39% have no difficulty regarding any of the four points and 28% only have a little difficulty with one step. However, ease of access is not universal. More than one in five respondents found that getting treatment presented at least some difficulty, while over one in 10 reported that getting treatment presented a lot of difficulty.

Individual resources and access to health services

The goal of health policy is to make care services available to those who need them most, but those low in social resources may face obstacles to access. For example, people in bad health can find even short distances an obstacle to getting treatment they need. Poor people are not only likely to have poorer health but may also find even limited charges for the use of health services a greater hindrance than those with more income. On the other hand, those with the highest incomes may balk at the time taken to get treatment, since 'time is money' and they earn more money.

Economic circumstances make a significant difference for accessing health services. Those who say their income is adequate have an average index rating of 2.6, while those with a lower income have a rating of 2.4 (Figure 11). Educated people are more likely to be at ease in dealing with health professionals

Figure 11: Relationship between individual resources and access to health services



Note: Results are based on the Access to Health Services Index, where 1 = 'very difficult', 2 = 'a little difficult' and 3 = 'no difficulty'; the scores are then added and divided by the number of questions answered to get the average figure.
Source: EQLS 2007

and health bureaucrats who control access. As the results show, those with a third-level education have an average score which is 0.2 of a point higher on the 3-point Access to Health Services Index compared with those without an education. There is also a slight gender difference: the average score for women on the index is 0.1 of a point lower than that for men.

Among adults, there is a strong relationship between age and the need for healthcare, since older people tend to be less healthy and more likely to need medical treatment. However, older people also have more free time. On the Access to Health Services Index, there is only 0.1 of a point difference between young Europeans and those over 65 years of age (Figure 11). However, the EQLS finds that whatever the respondents' age, 59% of those in the worst health report at least some difficulty in accessing a doctor or hospital, compared with 24% of persons in the best health. Physical infirmities are not the chief cause of difficulties in accessing health services: four fifths of those who report great difficulties say that their health is good or very good.

An OLS regression analysis controls for the inter-correlations between income, education, age and gender (see Annex Table A3). Sufficient income has the strongest influence on access to health services. After controlling for its influence, education still has a notable effect, while gender has a significant but very weak effect. After taking these differences into account, older people are not significantly different from younger people in their experience of difficulties in accessing health services.

Cross-country comparison

Effective access to health services is a key consideration of policies on social protection at EU level; it is also a priority of health policy in the Member States. The EQLS finds that access to health services tends to be high in almost every EU country. On the 3-point Access to Health Services Index, the average rating is 2.5, and access differs by only 0.1 of a point above or below that for the established EU15 countries and the 12 NMS (see Annex Figure A1). Very little variation exists between or within EU countries in access to health services.

The biggest cross-national difference in access to health services is found among established EU Member States. In Italy, the average score of 2.1 indicates that the majority of Italians reported a little difficulty in getting medical treatment. By contrast, in Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden, the average score of 2.8 shows that the great majority of their populations had no difficulty in access.

Health services make big claims on public finances. For example, it is a costly process achieving equal access for all persons by locating clinics in rural areas and having sufficient hospital staff and beds to minimise the time spent waiting for operations. Therefore, it would be expected that citizens of the more prosperous countries and the Member States spending a higher proportion of the national income on health would also report better access to health services. Although national ratings of access to health services do correlate at the aggregate level with a country's GDP per capita, the relationship is smaller than the correlation with the Transparency International measure of corruption. This is a reminder that how public money is spent, as well as how much is spent, influences citizens' ability to access the healthcare to which they are formally entitled.

Combining individual and national influences

The multilevel model analysis confirms that most people in the EU can access health services without major obstacles. Among the 14 potential influences, nine fail to register statistical significance. The five significant influences have a limited effect in accounting for variations in access, compared with

the influence of economic and social conditions on the Public Services Index and the Neighbourhood Services Index.[9]

Individual income has the biggest impact on access to health services. Having an income that is more than adequate boosts access by about 0.25 of an index point, while being deprived of a considerable amount of material resources hinders access by a similar amount (Figure 12). Thus, while people who are most prosperous have no difficulties in accessing health services, those who are worst off usually have at least a little difficulty in accessing such services. The importance of differences in individual income is underscored by the fact that, after controlling for the effect of individual differences, the amount of public expenditure on health per capita does not have a statistically significant influence on access to health services. Insofar as national GDP is important, its effect on access is indirect; higher national GDP increases the proportion of people with an adequate income, which in turn makes access to health services easier. Similarly, the level of individual income appears to be more important than a country's inequality of income, since national Gini indexes have no significant relationship with access (see Annex Table A7).

Figure 12: Multilevel model of major influences on access to health services



Note: Variance accounted for: (pseudo R^2) = 10.9%.
Results are based on the Access to Health Services Index, where 1 = 'very difficult', 2 = 'a little difficult' and 3 = 'no difficulty'; the scores are then added and divided by the number of questions answered to get the average figure.
Source: Calculated from the multilevel model shown in Annex Table A7

Age does not have a significant impact on access to health services. Nonetheless, older people are more experienced in using health services than younger persons. Retired people also have more time to wait in a doctor's office. After controlling for the effect of age and income, women are slightly more likely to report a little difficulty in accessing health services (Figure 12).

Although health services, such as hospitals, are not so widely dispersed as primary schools, neither the national nor the regional context is significant for accessing health services. Since the Transparency International CPI had no significant influence on access to health services, it was not included in the multivariate analysis. The notion that favouritism does not affect access is confirmed by the fact that people with more political contacts actually appear to be less likely to get medical treatment without

[9] The pseudo R^2, a standard measure of how much difference a set of independent variables makes, accounts for 10.9% of the variance in the Access to Health Services Index, compared with 20.4% in the Neighbourhood Services Index and 19.4% in the Public Services Index.

any difficulty (Figure 12). Since better hospitals and specialised treatments are more often available in cities, urbanisation could affect access; however, this link is also insignificant. Although the racial and religious heterogeneity of a neighbourhood is significant, the impact is slight, lowering access by only 0.03 of an index point.

Trust in institutions and people

6

The efficient, effective and equitable operation of society not only requires the investment of money and natural resources, but also cooperation between individuals and institutions that constitute a society's 'social capital' (Dasgupta and Serageldin, 1999; Putnam, 2000; Fahey, Nolan and Whelan, 2003). Trust reflects individual beliefs about whether the behaviour of other people can be relied on – for example, in obeying laws as well as showing consideration to strangers. It also reflects whether public policy institutions can be relied on to act fairly (Anderson et al, 2009, pp. 55ff). An individual's past experience of people doing what they say they will do and public institutions delivering services effectively is a basis for assessing the trustworthiness of individuals, political parties or government. A high level of trust creates confidence in public services and it may also stimulate economic development (Mandl et al, 2007). On the other hand, the absence of trust reduces the radius of cooperation with family and friends and makes it more difficult for government to rely on the support of citizens (Fukuyama, 1995).

Robert Putnam's (1993) theory of social capital links trust in people and in political institutions. Putman postulates that positive informal relations in the home, at work and in local communities encourage people to create formal organisations that can then 'spill up', leading to the formation of civil society institutions that represent the views and interests of individuals and social partners to national government. In turn, they can cooperate in representing interests and attitudes to EU institutions. The European Commission is now engaging in dialogue with civil society institutions in order to extend the radius of trust and cooperation from the lowest to the highest levels of the multilevel system that constitutes governance in Europe today (Robert Schuman Centre, 2009).

The absence of trust is also significant. People who do not trust the government will be less likely to endorse policy initiatives and the taxes needed to pay for them, relying instead on their own resources, especially a narrow circle of friends and family, and what they can buy in the market. Insofar as trust is learned by experience, people who are socialised in societies where institutions are untrustworthy will be less willing to rely for their welfare on the collective services of government or other providers. The EU's expansion in 2004 added 10 new Member States in which the median adult was socialised into a distrusted Communist political system (see Shlapentokh, 1989; Rose, 2009, Chapter 2). Moreover, corruption in government has been a recurring problem in some of the EU15 countries as well as the 12 NMS (see Transparency International).

Trust in political institutions is important to public officials and Members of Parliament (MPs) as a mark of popular respect or, where it is absent, a lack of respect. For this reason, an extensive body of social science literature exists about the causes and correlates of political trust (see, for example, Newton, 2007). However, there is much less evidence-based research about the political consequences of trust.

Measuring trust

The focus of trust differs radically: trust in other people is about informal personal relationships, while trust in political institutions concerns large-scale impersonal bureaucratic institutions (Newton, 2007, pp. 343ff). The EQLS takes this into account by asking questions about both types of relationships. It asks about political parties, which Putnam (1993) treats as central in linking informal social capital to national government. The survey also asks about authoritative state institutions, such as the police and the legal system. Respondents rate each institution on a 10-point scale, ranging from 1 indicating 'no trust at all' to 10 denoting 'complete trust' (Figure 13).

Figure 13: Index of trust in political institutions and people



Notes: Results are based on responses to Questions 23 and 27. Question 27: 'Please tell me how much you personally trust each of the following institutions: the parliament, the legal system, the press, the police, the government, political parties.' (based on a 10-point scale, where 1 = 'do not trust at all', and 10 = 'trust completely'); Question 23: 'Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?' (based on a 10-point scale, where 1 = 'can't be too careful', and 10 = 'most people can be trusted'). 'Press' is omitted from this analysis as it is not considered a political institution.
Source: EQLS 2007

Across the EU, Europeans tend to adopt a sceptical rather than a trusting or distrustful view of institutions (on scepticism, see Mishler and Rose, 1997). According to the EQLS results, the average level of trust for five political institutions (4.9), including the parliament, the legal system, the police, the government and political parties, is just below the middle of the 10-point scale (Figure 13).

Among the political institutions, trust is higher in institutions wielding authority firmly – that is, the police (6.1) and the legal system (5.2). The average for both is above the arithmetic midpoint. By contrast, the averages for the three representative institutions – the government (4.6), parliament (4.6) and political parties (3.9) – are below the midpoint, and there is a difference of more than two points in the average level of trust in political parties (3.9) and the police (6.1). In keeping with the tendency of having doubts about institutions, few Europeans express extreme views. On average, only 3% endorse complete trust in a political institution, while 13% express no trust in an institution.

In terms of the trustworthiness of most people, the average European takes a sceptical view. With an average of 5.2, trust in most people is significantly below that for trust in the police (6.1). The similarity of the average level of trust in people and of trust in institutions is consistent with Putnam's (1993) hypothesis that the two objects of trust reflect a single outlook. However, this may be an artefact of conflating trust in most people with people one knows. Surveys that ask about each group separately consistently find a much higher level of trust in people one knows. For example, in 10 of the NMS, an average of 72% of citizens trust most people they know, while only 42% of them trust most people in their country (Rose, 2005, p. 66).

Insofar as individuals have a pervasive disposition to either trust or distrust, then a factor analysis should find that trust in people and trust in institutions should be similar statistically. However, this is not the case (see Annex Table A2). All five political institutions have high loadings. By contrast, trust in most people does not, and its low loading shows that it is not strongly related to trust in institutions. This finding is consistent with many other empirical studies rejecting Putnam's theory (see Newton, 2001; Uslaner, 2002, p. 54).

The factor analysis thus justifies creating an index that includes trust in the five political institutions named in Figure 13. It also justifies treating trust in most people as a separate attitude. The average score for the Trust in Political Institutions Index is 4.9, whereas the average score for trust in most people is 5.2. There are widespread differences of opinion on both counts. Two fifths of people are more or less inclined to trust institutions, while a further two fifths are inclined to be distrustful. The willingness to trust other people similarly varies. One third are below the median point for trusting other people, while more than two fifths are above this point. These variations may be accounted for by differences in national context, in individual resources or by a combination of both sets of influences.

How countries differ in levels of trust

Consistent with theories that trust in political institutions reflects the way in which national government works, large differences emerge among the EU countries in their average levels of trust. The level of trust is highest in Denmark (7.2 on a 10-point scale) and Finland (6.9); it is lowest in Bulgaria (3.3) and Latvia (3.5). Trust in people also differs substantially within every country (Table 2).

Table 2: Trust in political institutions and in people, by country

	Trust in political institutions	Trust in most people
DK	7.2	7.2
FI	6.9	7.0
SE	6.2	6.8
NL	6.1	6.5
AT	6.0	4.8
LU	5.9	5.8
MT	5.5	4.9
ES	5.5	5.7
EE	5.3	5.1
IE	5.3	5.8
BE	5.2	5.6
DE	5.2	4.8
FR	5.1	5.5
EL	4.9	4.2
UK	4.9	5.3
SK	4.7	5.2
PT	4.5	4.3
SI	4.3	5.2
IT	4.2	5.0
RO	4.2	5.5
CZ	4.0	4.5
HU	4.0	4.7
PL	4.0	4.8
LT	3.8	4.4
LV	3.5	4.0
BG	3.3	4.1
EU15	**5.1**	**5.3**
EU26*	**4.9**	**5.2**
NMS12	**4.0**	**4.8**

Notes: The score for political trust represents the average for the five political institutions listed in Question 27 (see Figure 13), based on a 10-point scale, where 1 = 'do not trust at all' and 10 = 'trust completely'. * Cyprus is omitted from the results.
Source: EQLS 2007

In Communist systems, the one-party state purged institutions of civil society. Instead of social partners, government ministries controlled large industrial complexes and the ruling Communist party also controlled trade unions. This generated a high level of political distrust and has left a legacy of weak civil society institutions and widespread distrust in political institutions (Howard, 2003; Rose and Munro, 2009). In the 10 NMS that formerly had Communist regimes, the average level of trust in political institutions is 4.0, while in the EU15 countries it is more than a full point higher (5.1) (Table 2). On the other hand, as the repressive nature of Communist regimes encouraged people to establish strong face-to-face ties with friends and family, the average score for trusting people in the NMS is higher at 4.8. However, the radius of trust in other people is smaller in the NMS countries.

Maintaining the integrity of political institutions is a challenge for governments across the whole of Europe. Where a government is successful in doing so, this encourages trust in political institutions, whereas where corruption is perceived to be widespread, trust is substantially lower. The correlation between trust in political institutions and a country's rating on the Transparency International CPI is very strong (r: 0.85). The Nordic countries scoring highest on the Transparency International index of integrity in government also have the highest ratings regarding trust in institutions. On the other hand, people in countries that score lowest in government transparency, such as Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania, express the least trust in political institutions (Figure 14). The association between poor government transparency and low levels of trust in political institutions cuts across the EU15 and NMS: Estonia maintains a similar position to Portugal and Spain on both counts, while Greece and Italy can be found close to Poland and Hungary.

National scores for 'trust in most people' also correlate significantly with the scores on the CPI (r: 0.49). However, the relationship is not so strong as that for political trust. This is because trust in most people is not distributed between countries in the same way as trust in political institutions. For example, although Romania and the UK register a similar level of trust in most people, there is a big difference in the extent to which their governments are perceived as corrupt or transparent.

Figure 14: Relationship between transparency in government and trust in political institutions, by country



Source: Transparency International, CPI 2007; EQLS 2007

Individual resources and trust

Insofar as trust in political institutions is associated with political participation, the resources that people have to participate in public affairs ought to increase political trust (see Verba et al, 1995; Blais, 2000). Income and education are two major resources making individuals more effective political participants and they have a positive effect on trust in political institutions. In relation to the latter, the average score of individuals with an adequate income is 0.9 of a point higher than for those having trouble making ends meet (Table 3). Among people with more education, trust in political institutions is 0.7 of a point higher. Similarly, significant differences can be found for trust in most people. On the other hand, age only slightly increases trust in political institutions, while gender is of no importance. Moreover, on the basis of age and gender, the relationship is similar for trust in most people.

Table 3: Relationship between individual resources and trust in political institutions and in most people

	Trust in political institutions (average score)	Trust in most people (average score)
Adequate income		
Yes	5.2	5.5
No	4.3	4.7
Third-level education		
Yes	5.4	5.8
No	4.7	5.0
Age		
Young	4.9	5.2
Old	5.1	5.3
Gender		
Female	4.9	5.2
Male	4.9	5.3

Source: EQLS 2007

Given the tendency for individual resources to be correlated, an OLS regression analysis can test the conjoint effect of all four resources. Such an analysis confirms that income and education are the most important influences on political trust; it also gives additional weight to the effect of age but not gender. Together, the four influences account for 8.9% of the difference between individuals in political trust and for 5.5% of the difference in trust in most people (see Annex Table A3).

Combining individual and national contexts

The single biggest influence on trust in political institutions is national context: the better a government's rating on the Transparency International CPI, the higher the level of political trust is likely to be. After controlling for all other influences, government transparency accounts for almost two points in the 10-point Political Trust Index (Figure 15).

People's economic resources also have a substantial impact. Whether a government is transparent or not, citizens whose income is very adequate show greater trust in government by more than a full point more than those with a very inadequate income. Individuals with insufficient incomes are also likely to be the most deprived, and this additionally lowers their trust.

Church attendance also has a substantial effect on political trust (Figure 15). People who go to church regularly tend to be more trusting in political institutions by more than half a point. Older people also tend to be more trusting. Since this influence is confirmed after controlling for other factors, it means

that older churchgoers are inclined to show greater trust in political institutions by almost a point higher than young persons who do not attend church. The effect of education on trust is positive; however, the impact is less than half that of age and one third the impact of church attendance.

Figure 15: Multilevel model of major influences on political trust



Notes: Variance accounted for: (pseudo R^2) = 21.6%.
The Political Trust Index shows the average response to the five political trust questions asked in the EQLS.
Source: Calculated from multilevel model shown in Annex Table A8

How one is integrated in society affects political distrust. However, having more or fewer political contacts is not significantly related to trust. More significant is being from a family that have been citizens for generations – while this group constitutes the majority in all countries, it is becoming less the case since the opening up of national borders to migration between continents as well as within Europe. People in this group are more distrustful of political institutions (Figure 15). The impact is increased if a person lives in a neighbourhood that is heterogeneous in race or religion. If these characteristics are combined with an inadequate income and a lack of further education, this creates a limited but statistically significant category of young, uneducated, poor citizens with strong roots in their country but with a high level of distrust in political institutions.

For the most part, trust in other people reflects influences that are similar to those for political institutions, although the scale of the impact is not as strong[10] (see Annex Table A8). Since the extent of government transparency encourages trust in most people in society, this implies that popular perceptions of government's integrity can 'spill down' to affect people's views of their fellow citizens generally. An individual's economic resources also have a major impact: a good income tends to boost trust in most people by more than a point, while suffering multiple material deprivations diminishes trust in other people by almost 0.8 of a point. The impact of individual economic circumstances on trust in most people is thus even greater than their impact on political trust.

Involvement in homogeneous social groups – whether being part of a church congregation or living in an ethnically homogeneous neighbourhood – has a positive effect on trusting most people. Third-level education, which tends to mix people from diverse backgrounds at a young age, also creates

[10] The multilevel model accounts for 21.6% of the variance in trust in political institutions and for 13.6% of the variance in trust in most people. The impact of significant variables for trust in most people is as follows: 1.39 for transparency; 1.03 for adequacy of income; -0.79 for deprivation; 0.32 for further education; 0.25 for church attendance; -0.21 for ethnic heterogeneity; and 0.45 for political contacts.

greater trust in other people. Up to a point, the multilevel model supports Putnam's (1993) theory of political participation, since those with more political contacts are also more trusting of other people. However, the radius of trust is limited, as these contacts do not add up to trust in impersonal political institutions. Moreover, given the speculation about differences between urban and rural areas in social capital and trust (Mandl et al, 2007), it is noteworthy that the multilevel analysis found that there was no significant relationship between urban and rural residents in their trust in political institutions and in most people. Moreover, whether a region is below or above the EU average for economic development has no significant effect on trust.

The results of the multilevel analysis support the theoretical argument that political trust is a consequence of public policy, as well as supporting empirical evidence of the negative legacy of Communist regimes for trust (Dasgupta, 1988; Newton, 2007). However, the legacy is not permanent nor can it be attributed to culture, as there is a degree of trust in all EU countries. The chief reason why people show less trust is rooted in the current performance of political institutions, as registered in the Transparency International CPI. If a national government is positively rated on the CPI – as governments in some but not all of the NMS are – then there is greater trust in most people as well as in political institutions. With one exception, none of the other indexes of government performance shows a comparable impact. The significant correlation (0.46) between a country's public services and political trust indexes reinforces the judgment that it is the performance of a country's political institutions that has major responsibility for popular trust or distrust.

Tensions in society 7

Every European society is divided by age, gender and economic resources. Among the 27 EU Member States, major differences also exist in the state's relationship with religion, and within each country citizens differ greatly in the degree or absence of religious commitment. Historically, EU Member States have differed in the extent to which they are ethnically homogeneous. The increased transnational mobility of EU citizens, combined with inter-continental population movements, has introduced new, albeit often small, ethnic groups to many EU countries.

EU policies celebrate diversity as a way of enhancing quality of life. Recognition is given to 23 official languages in publications and statements. The goal of social cohesion not only recognises the existence of differences within every society, but also the desirability of strong ties between groups that differ in gender, age and economic status. Three Directorates General of the European Commission – Education, Audiovisual and Culture, Information Society and Media – and the Europe Aid Cooperation Office[11] support action programmes promoting greater familiarisation of Europeans, especially young people, with other countries and cultures.

The logic of social cohesion is that the differences which inevitably exist within society should be a source of strength, leading to cooperation between people who differ. For example, economic differences between employers and employees are not ignored, but are the subject of collective bargaining.

Given that social, economic and political differences are inevitable within every society, the substantive issue for the EU and national governments is whether differences are politicised. Many differences – for example, whether people are born on an odd or an even numbered day of the month – are of no political relevance. At any one time, there are a limited number of issues that can catch the attention of policymakers. The larger the proportion of Europeans who think that differences are a source of tension, the greater the responsibility of policymakers to act before tensions threaten social cohesion. Although tensions may be manifest in local neighbourhoods, there is also an EU dimension when they reflect differences found in every European society – for instance, between classes of society and income groups – and especially when tensions are the consequence of the transnational movement of people.

Measuring social tensions

Whether and to which extent social differences are translated into tensions in society is an empirical question. To assess this, the EQLS asked people to assess whether tensions exist in their society between six different social groups. Two of these social groups are economic – that is, management and workers, and rich and poor; two concern different religions, racial and ethnic groups; and two focus respectively on young and old persons, and on men and women. If people perceive tension, they are asked to rate it as 'a lot of tension' or 'some tension'. On the other hand, they can endorse the opposite alternative – that is, 'no tension'.

Across Europe, the overall tendency is to recognise some tension in society. For each of the six social groups, almost half of the respondents choose this intermediate position, and for four of the groups an absolute majority do so (Figure 16). However, the proportion of respondents perceiving lots of tension varies greatly. As many as 40% of respondents perceive a lot of tensions in racial and ethnic relations, but less than half of this proportion (18%) do so for relations between young and old persons or between women and men (12%). It is particularly noticeable that economic differences are no more likely to cause a lot of tension than are racial and religious differences.

[11] See http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/index_en.htm.

Figure 16: Overview of tensions perceived between different social groups (%)



Notes: Results are based on responses to Question 29: 'In your opinion, how much tension is there between each of the following groups in [this country]?' ('a lot of tension', 'some tension', 'no tension', 'don't know'). 'Don't know' responses are excluded here.
Source: EQLS 2007

Tensions in society can coexist with tensions within individuals themselves. Thus, some individuals are likely to project their psychological tensions onto society, rather than assess their society as it is. If this was the case, then people who perceive tension in one part of society would consistently see it in other parts. However, this is not in fact the case. Only 7% of EQLS respondents consistently report seeing tensions across all segments of society, while just 3% never observe any tensions.

A factor analysis confirms that feelings of tension about one social group are not necessarily generalised to another group. Unlike questions about public services, access to health services and trust in political institutions, the factor analysis of tensions identifies two different factors (see Annex Table A9). The first factor, accounting for 47% of the variance, loads highest for tensions between rich and poor people and between managers and workers.[12] It is thus justifiable to combine individual answers to questions about tensions between rich and poor people and between managers and workers to create an 'economic tensions scale'. Religious, racial and ethnic differences load highly on the second factor, which accounts for over 16% of the variance. Distinctions between religious, racial and ethnic groups can sometimes overlap. Hence, attitudes towards tensions between religious and ethnic groups are analysed together.

Economic tensions

Although European economies were doing well when the EQLS was undertaken in 2007, this did not produce harmony between management and workers or between rich and poor people. The largest group of respondents (43%) took an intermediate position, perceiving some tensions on both counts. A lot of tension on at least one count was perceived by 41% of the respondents, including 20% who

[12] The relationship recurs in almost exactly the same degree in separate factor analyses for the EU15 Member States and the NMS, and in an analysis of comparable questions asked in the 2003 EQLS.

viewed a lot of tension in both respects. Only 7% of respondents perceived no economic tensions in their society on either count, while 9% saw some tension on one count.

Europeans who regard their income as inadequate are more likely to perceive economic tensions in their society. The tendency is 0.2 of a point on the 3-point scale, where a score of 2 represents a 'lot of tension', 1 'some tension' and 0 'no feeling of tension'. Those who do not have any difficulty in making ends meet often see some tensions as well (see Annex Table A10). More educated people, who ought to be more aware of problems of society, are slightly less likely to see tensions in society than are less educated persons. Economic tensions are somewhat asymmetrical: they are felt more by people at the bottom of the social ladder than by those with a better income and education. Younger people are slightly more likely to perceive tensions in economic life; however, there is no difference on this count between men and women. As almost every European sees at least some economic tension, there is much less variation to explain. While an OLS regression finds all four variables statistically significant, the total amount of variance accounted for is very low at just 2.3%.

Major differences are evident between countries in the perceived degree of economic tension – ranging from a score of 1.6 in Hungary to 0.7 in Denmark (see Annex Table A11). However, the extent of tension does not follow a simple division between the EU15 and NMS. For example, the score for France (1.4) is double that for Denmark (0.7), while the score for Hungary (1.6) is almost two thirds greater than that for Bulgaria (1.0). Overall, there is no difference between the overall average score for the NMS (1.2) and for the EU15 (1.2). While it may be theoretically argued that greater economic inequality should increase economic tension, the correlation between the Gini index of inequality and a country's level of perceived economic tension is not statistically significant (0.22).

Looking at the multilevel model of major influences on economic tensions, the most striking feature is how little impact 14 major social and economic indicators have on economic tension. Even though eight different indicators – notably, regional development, income adequacy, deprivation, age, gender, church attendance, being a long-term citizen and political contacts – achieve a degree of statistical significance, collectively they account for only 4.8% of the variance in economic tension (Figure 17). The national context has no statistically significant impact on economic tension, once individual differences are taken into account. Moreover, the multilevel model confirms that living in a country with a higher Gini coefficient of income inequality has no effect on individual perceptions of tensions. Similarly, economic tension does not seem to reflect objective economic circumstances: a country's GDP per capita has no significant influence on economic tensions. There is, however, a contextual

Figure 17: Multilevel model of major influences on economic tensions



Note: Variance accounted for: (pseudo R^2) = 4.8%.
Source: Calculated from multilevel model shown in Annex Table A12

difference within countries: living in a region where economic development is higher reduces economic tensions by 0.15 of a point on the 3-point scale.

A person's economic situation has the biggest impact on the perception of tensions, although the extent is not that large. Those whose income is adequate are likely to be 0.25 of a point below the norm for sensing economic tension in their society. Conversely, if a person belongs to that small group suffering a high level of deprivation, they will be almost 0.2 of a point higher on the scale measuring perceived tension (Figure 17).

People who have political contacts are more likely to perceive economic tensions in their society, increasing the pressure on policymakers. Tensions are also more likely to be felt by long-term citizens who may be more integrated in party politics. The impact of age, gender and church attendance on economic tensions lacks direct integration with the political and policy process.

Racial, ethnic and religious tensions

European countries are today becoming ethnically more heterogeneous. The free movement of people within the EU has resulted in 13% of EQLS respondents either being born in a different country from that in which they are now living or having one or both parents who are not native-born. Entry to the EU is also open to people born in other continents who have family, ethnic or ex-colonial ties to a Member State. In addition, the growth in cheap air transport has made it possible for people to travel across continents in search of work or political refuge. Legally, the status of all citizens of Europe is the same, whatever their race, creed or nationality of origin.

Differences in the religious, ethnic and racial composition of national populations vary greatly between the EU Member States and tend to have increased in recent decades – although no country is as diverse on all three counts as the US. The development of the Single European Market has facilitated geographical mobility across Europe. Migrants who differ in race, ethnicity and/or religion from host societies have been attracted to EU countries. This is reflected in the perception of tensions: 40% of respondents see racial and ethnic differences as causing a lot of tension, while 31% associate religion with a lot of tension. In addition, almost half of the respondents (49%) see some tension (see Figure 16).

In many cases, a person can be distinctive on multiple counts – for example, being a Nigerian and a Muslim or an Algerian and a Muslim. The high correlation (0.62) of European perceptions of tensions on religious, racial and ethnic grounds justifies creating a single Religious and Racial Tensions Index (see Annex Table A13). According to the EQLS results, 25% of respondents perceive a lot of tension on both counts, while 36% see some tensions in both respects, and 30% see no tension on one count but some or a lot on the other. Only 9% of respondents report no racial, religious or ethnic tension in their society.

Economic conditions are often cited as an explanation for tensions, based on the assumption that a largely migrant group of people competes for scarce jobs or lowers wages. Insofar as this is the case, it is likely that lower paid workers and those with less education would be most threatened. However, low income people are, at most, only 4% more likely to see racial tensions, while less educated persons are only 3% more likely to see tensions (Table 4). Young people are more likely to see tensions than older people, and there is also a slight tendency for tensions to be felt more by women than men. Socioeconomic differences cannot explain the sense of racial, ethnic or religious tension. OLS regressions confirm that income, education and gender make no substantial difference to feelings of tension: together, they only account for 1% of the variance in racial and religious tensions.

An alternative explanation is that racial, ethnic and religious tensions are caused by people who the majority perceive are 'not like us'. Whereas longstanding minorities in a society may be integrated or at least be familiar – for example, people of Irish nationality living in Britain or ethnic Turks living in Bulgaria – groups of migrants that differ in race, language and religious practices will not appear like the settled majority community. Nonetheless, according to the EQLS results, people whose families are long-established citizens are only 2% to 4% more likely to perceive religious or racial tensions than people whose families have an immigrant character (Table 4). Where people live also affects tensions: those who live in very mixed neighbourhoods are 4% to 7% more likely to consider that there is a lot of tension in their society. Among people who go to church, there is actually a significantly lower perception of religious or ethnic tension than among those who do not go to church. Given that many immigrants are often practising Muslims, this implies that Christian churchgoers tend to be less disturbed by people with an alternative religious commitment than are those who are not churchgoers or who have a secular view of their society.

Table 4: Relationship between individual resources and racial and religious tensions

	% perceiving a lot of racial tension	% perceiving a lot of religious tension
Adequate income		
Yes	38	30
No	42	32
Third-level education		
Yes	37	29
No	40	31
Age		
Young	40	31
Old	34	26
Gender		
Female	41	32
Male	39	29
Long-term citizen		
Yes	40	31
No	36	29
Churchgoer (at least monthly)		
Yes	34	25
No	42	33
Racial, ethnic neighbourhood mix		
Many people different from majority	45	34
Some people different from majority	39	31
Almost no one different	38	30

Source: EQLS 2007

Collectively, the EU is multicultural: Member States differ in establishing a state religion or having none, in language use and in national identities. A few countries, such as Belgium, were created as a multi-ethnic state, where the Flemings and the Walloons each speak a different language and historically have also been internally divided by religion and class. In countries such as Hungary and Romania, there is a notable Roma minority. Bulgaria and Finland, meanwhile, have an ethnic minority that is a legacy from past imperial settlements: in the case of Finland, this minority comprises Swedes,

while in Bulgaria it comprises Turks. The EQLS pan-European focus meant that it did not include questions about tensions with minorities found in a limited number of countries, such as the Roma minority group. Some countries are ethnically and racially homogeneous; this tends to be the case in central and east European states, such as Poland, that suffered from the forced movement of population and genocide during the Second World War.

Large differences are evident between countries in the extent of perceived tensions between ethnic and racial groups. In the Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Italy and the Netherlands, at least half of the population sees racial and ethnic differences as a source of 'a lot of tension' (see Annex Table A13). Conversely, in five of the NMS – namely, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland – a fifth or less of respondents perceive a lot of tension in this respect (Figure 18). Low levels of perceived tension in the Baltic states is particularly noteworthy – indicating that they have largely succeeded in accommodating substantial minorities of Russian ethnics, some of whom are not citizens (Pettai and Zielonka, 2003; Rose et al, 2006). Tension between religious groups is perceived to be high in Austria, France, Italy and the Netherlands, where more than two fifths of respondents see a lot of tension. However, in 11 countries, less than one fifth of people view religion as a source of a lot of tension – in three of these countries, namely Bulgaria, Estonia and Latvia – less than one tenth of respondents report this tension.

Consistent with the factor analysis of individuals, at the national level there is a strong and significant correlation (0.82) between the aggregate level of religious tension and racial and ethnic tension (Figure 18). It is particularly noteworthy that the EU15 countries tend to be substantially higher on both measures of tension than their NMS counterparts. This pattern leaves open to empirical testing the cause of these differences.

A country's attractiveness to immigrants varies according to economic circumstances, as well as geographical and historical ties. Statistics about immigrants are notoriously difficult to collect. EU

Figure 18: Relationship between racial and religious tensions, by country (%)



Note: Results show proportion of respondents who perceive 'a lot of tension' in these areas in each of EU27 Member States. Scores for groups of countries are weighted by population.
R = .82
Source: EQLS 2007

Member States differ in national practices for registering such information or not doing so, and the EU's encouragement of the free movement of people across national borders makes it difficult to keep statistics up to date. Eurostat (2008) statistics collected from national statistical offices identify four countries – namely, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK – with more than 400,000 immigrants from other continents as well as from other EU countries. Three smaller countries have more than 100,000 immigrants – namely, Austria, Ireland and the Netherlands. Countries that attract a large proportion of immigrants do so because they are prosperous: a large and significant correlation is evident between a country's GDP per capita and the percentage of its population that is made up of immigrants (r: 0.55). An even stronger correlation can be observed between GDP and immigrants from outside the EU (r: 0.70). In addition, marginally significant correlations are visible at the national level between immigration from outside the EU and racial and ethnic tensions (r: 0.37) as well as religious tensions (r: 0.41).

Statistics about religion are difficult to collect, and this is doubly true when the focus is on the religion of non-EU immigrants. The European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) (2006) estimates – on the basis of official national statistics and unofficially documented data – that there are approximately 13 million Muslims living in the EU (for a discussion on a country-by-country basis, see the European Parliament Policy Department, 2007, pp. 81ff). Even after discounting for the special situation of Bulgaria, where the historic Muslim population represents 12% of the national population, the EU's Muslim population is unevenly distributed. In 13 countries, less than 1% of the population is estimated to be Muslim, while in five countries – namely, the Netherlands, France, Sweden, Germany and Austria – it ranges between 5.8% and 4.1% (Figure 19).

Figure 19: Correlation between percentage of Muslims in population and racial/religious tension, by country (%)



Note: The proportion of people in a country who perceive a lot of religious or ethnic tensions consists of those with a score of 1.5 or higher on the combined Ethnic and Religious Tensions Index. Bulgaria is excluded because its indigenous Muslim population is large – in this country, 46% of people perceive a lot of religious or ethnic tensions.
R = .72
Source: Data on the Muslim population were obtained from the EUMC, 2006, pp. 29–31, with the exception of data on Muslims in Romania. In the latter country, the 0.3% estimate was obtained from 2002 Romanian census data.

Moreover, while the percentage of Muslims is less in the UK and Spain, each of these two populous countries is estimated to have more than one million Muslim inhabitants (EUMC, 2006, pp. 29–33).

Although Muslims represent only a few percent of the population of any European society, the percentage of Muslims in a society has a strong and significant correlation with the perception of religious tension in a society (Figure 19). This correlation appears to be caused by the extent to which the majority population perceives Muslims as aliens who are 'not like us'. The link is greater in more prosperous countries, where Muslim immigrants tend to be concentrated. For example, in Sweden, where 4.4% of the population is estimated to be Muslim, 31% of respondents perceive a lot of racial or religious tension. In the EU15 countries, where Muslims constitute an estimated 3.3% of the total population, some 33% of people report that there is a lot of religious tension. On the other hand, in the NMS, where only 0.07% of the population is estimated to be Muslim, there is no significant association with religious tension.

The first step in testing whether attitudes towards religious and racial or ethnic tensions reflect the same causes was to undertake separate multilevel model regressions for each measure and – using the same independent variables – including the estimated percentage of Muslims in the population and the percentage of non-EU immigrants. Since the same conditions influenced both measures, the two indicators of tension have been combined into a single measure of religious, racial and ethnic tension.[13] Doing so recognises that the perceived objects of tension often differ from their host community on grounds of both religion and ethnicity or race.

National context has the biggest impact by far on the index of religious, racial and ethnic tensions (see Figure 20 and Annex Table A14). Where Muslims are most numerous, reported tensions tend to be more than one third of a point higher on the three-point index. Since a country's overall proportion of non-EU immigrants is not statistically significant, this supports the view that it is the characteristics of Muslim migrants in Europe that are associated with tension rather than simply being an immigrant from any non-EU country. In addition, countries with the highest level of GDP per capita tend to have a level of perceived tension that is almost one third of a point higher. The influence on tension is smaller with regard to living in a neighbourhood that is ethnically heterogeneous and being part of a family of long-established citizens.

Individual economic characteristics have some offsetting impact: individuals with a more adequate income are less likely to sense religious or ethnic tensions. However, a person who is well off in a country with high GDP is more likely to feel religious and racial tension than an individual who is well off in a country with low GDP. Moreover, those who have difficulty in making ends meet in a prosperous country are even more likely to feel such tensions. The fact that being employed has no significant impact on tension indicates that it is cultural differences rather than job competition that accounts for tension. This point is reinforced by the finding that being more deprived economically does not significantly alter an individual's feeling of tension.

Even though the oldest members of society will have experienced the biggest changes in its composition, they are substantially less likely to perceive tensions between racial or religious groups. This may be because they are less involved in society, which would be consistent with the finding that people who

[13] The composite index was created by scoring 2 points for respondents who saw a lot of tension on both counts (25%); 1.5 for those who saw a lot of tension on one count and some on the other (17%); 1 point for respondents perceiving some tension on both counts (39%); 0.5 of a point for those seeing some tension on one count and none on the other (9%); and 0 points for respondents perceiving no tension on both counts (10%). The average index score is 1.20 and the standard deviation is 0.61.

have more political contacts are associated with seeing more religious and racial tension. Churchgoers are also less likely to feel tension arising from people with different beliefs entering their society – this is an indication that tensions do not reflect doctrinal differences but rather cultural and behavioural differences.

Figure 20: Multilevel model of major influences on perceived religious and racial tensions



Note: Variance accounted for: (pseudo R^2) = 8.6%.
Bulgaria is excluded because of its large indigenous Muslim population.
Source: Calculated from the multilevel model shown in Annex Table A14

Tensions related to age and gender

Although differences according to age and gender are found in every society, they are not primary grounds for competition between political parties. With greater or lesser success, parties try to appeal for the votes of men and women and of young and old persons. There are no 'women only' or 'men only' parties in Europe, and when parties are created to represent pensioners, they demonstrate that few older people will vote for them (Hanley, 2008). Consistent with this, only a limited minority of Europeans report that they see a lot of tension between young and old persons (17%) or between men and women (12%). Similarly, on the 3-point scale for measuring tension, the average score for tension related to gender falls between none and some (0.8). A similar score is reported for tension between age groups (0.9).

Even though tension is low, significant social consequences could arise if the level of tension was perceived differently by women and men, or by young people and old persons. However, this is not the case. The percentage of women seeing a lot of gender tension in society amounts to 13% compared with 10% for men. When controls are introduced for income, age and education, gender remains a statistically significant influence on the perception of tension, but its association is very weak (see Annex Table A10). A multilevel model analysis confirms this result (see Annex Table A15). The impact of being female increases the perception of gender tension by 0.09 of a point, but this is barely half the impact that having major difficulty in making ends meet has on the perception of economic tension in a country. Living in the EU15 or NMS has no significant effect on tension: 12% of people report a lot of tension in the EU15 and 11% do so in the NMS. Overall, neither contextual nor individual characteristics make much difference to the low level of perceived tension between men and women.

Turning to the issue of age, the greater longevity of older people has meant that pensions constitute the biggest claim on public expenditure. Concurrently, declining birth rates result in fewer people of working age financing the rising cost of pensions. Since young workers must contribute for up to 40 years before they can draw a pension, frequent claims of an increasing conflict of economic interest between young and old people have arisen (for a review, see Tepe and Vanhuysse, 2009).

However, not only is the perception of tension between young and old people low, such a perception also appears to be evenly spread across age groups. Of those aged 18–29 years, 18% see a lot of tension; almost the same proportion of people aged 65 years or over hold the same view. A multivariate OLS regression analysis finds no significant influence on the perception of intergenerational tensions (see Annex Table A16). Thus, no social group appears to be particularly prone to perceiving tension between young and old people. Contextual differences are similarly insignificant: in the EU15 Member States, some 17% of respondents see a lot of tension between age groups; in the NMS, where the collapse of the old regime introduced a fundamental discontinuity in experience between generations, this proportion is only slightly higher at 20%. The multilevel model regression can account for only 0.9% of the variance and age again fails to achieve statistical significance.

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has taken a strong stand against age discrimination, and this is consistent with the EQLS finding that on many important issues of public policy there is no age divide. For example, even though pensions are of particular importance for older people, they give first priority for public expenditure to health services, as do younger people (Tepe and Vanhuysse, 2009). Similarly, the low level of tension between men and women can be interpreted as reflecting the positive influence of EU policies, including major efforts to promote gender equality.

Policy implications for social cohesion 8

Social cohesion is about achieving a minimum of differences between Member States and between social groups. However, the Eurofound quality of society indexes identify significant differences between people and between countries. Insofar as these differences are cumulative across all indexes, this would constitute social and cross-national polarisation. Nevertheless, if those who are badly off economically vary from one index to another, their problems cannot be addressed through a 'one size fits all' solution. The appropriate response would be to target policies carefully to address specific limitations on social cohesion.

Constructing a standardised index

A technical problem arises when comparing indexes. In some questions, respondents are asked to make an evaluation on a 10-point scale, while in others they are asked to rate their answer on a 3-point or 4-point scale. In order to make comparisons across indexes, it is necessary to create a standard metric. This can be done by setting the average score for EQLS countries at 100 and giving each country a score according to its distance from this average. Thus, if the average index score is 2.5, a country with a score of 2.0 would have a standardised score of 80 – that is, four fifths of the European average. Similarly, a country with an average score of 2.75 would have a standardised score of 110. Standardised scores make it possible to determine whether or not countries tend to be above the European average on some indexes and below the average on others.

When each country's standardised score is averaged across all indexes, there is a great deal of bunching: for instance, the average score for 23 of the EU27 Member States is between 90 and 110 (Table 5). The countries' standardised average score is spread far less than that in relation to the countries' GDP per capita, their Gini index of inequality, or their rating on the Transparency International CPI. Only two countries score higher than 10% above the average for quality of society – namely, Denmark (120) and Finland (114) – while two countries are well below the average – that is, Hungary (81) and Italy (83).

Generalisations about high and low quality societies assume that most countries will either be consistently above or below the European average. In fact, no country is consistently above average on all six indexes determining the quality of society (Table 5). The best performing countries – Denmark and Finland – fall short due to their high level of perceived tension between racial, ethnic and religious groups. Only Hungary and Italy consistently have a below-average score. Overall, the EU15 Member States are only one point above the average on the 100-point standardised index, while the average score for NMS countries is only two points below the standardised index.

The critical question for social cohesion is not whether countries differ but how great the differences are. For instance, are they so large as to appear as differences in kind or are they of a size consistent with the EU's commitment to combining unity and diversity? On four indexes, substantial cross-national differences are evident (Figure 21). It should be noted that for consistency in comparison across indexes, tension scores have been reversed, making their high standardised score reflect a low level of tension. The biggest is between countries with a high or low level of economic tension. In Denmark, for example, the index score for the proportion of respondents indicating that there is not a lot of economic tension (153) is more than half that of the European average (100). At the other extreme, Hungary's score (42) reflects the relatively high proportion of citizens who perceive a lot of economic tension. While there is a tendency for tensions to be higher in the NMS than in the EU15, this trend does not apply uniformly.

Table 5: Standardised index for aspects of quality of society, by country

	Index of						
	Public services	Neigh-bourhood	Access to health services	Political trust	Low economic tension	Low religious/ racial tension	Average
DK	115	111	109	144	153	85	120
FI	124	112	109	137	112	100	114
CY	90	103	100	102	133	112	110
SE	115	110	109	125	117	79	108
EE	102	101	103	107	95	131	107
MT	116	93	100	110	128	100	106
IE	97	103	103	106	115	98	105
LV	84	97	97	70	105	149	104
AT	115	106	102	120	115	70	103
LU	119	98	107	118	92	101	103
NL	112	109	109	121	110	61	102
ES	103	101	99	110	101	98	102
SK	97	100	95	95	95	122	101
PT	82	98	90	90	105	123	101
UK	102	106	106	98	112	78	100
BG	74	84	97	65	113	141	100
BE	115	98	105	105	105	81	99
DE	98	108	101	105	82	88	97
RO	88	99	96	85	91	111	96
LT	95	94	97	76	76	134	95
PL	93	91	94	79	89	120	95
EL	79	91	97	98	86	104	95
SI	101	106	96	86	75	97	92
FR	104	99	107	102	72	69	90
CZ	103	103	95	80	84	90	90
IT	88	87	83	85	96	62	83
HU	89	93	93	80	42	96	81
EU15	**105**	**103**	**102**	**111**	**105**	**86**	**101**
NMS12	**94**	**97**	**97**	**86**	**94**	**117**	**98**
EU27 (average)	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**
Standard deviation	**13**	**7**	**6**	**20**	**22**	**24**	**9**

Notes: 100 = Average national score for a given index. The results are weighted equally. The computation of a standardised index score involves calculating a coefficient by dividing 100 by the index average for the EU27 countries weighted equally and then multiplying each country's average by the coefficient.
Source: EQLS 2007

In France and Germany, for instance, economic tension is significantly greater than in most of the NMS countries. Cross-country differences in racial, religious and ethnic tension are also substantial: a gap of 88 points exists between Latvia, where such tension is lowest, and the Netherlands, where it is the highest. Moreover, a 79-point difference can be found between countries in relation to political trust, with Denmark and Bulgaria marking the two extremes. The standard deviations for these two tension measures show that a third of countries will differ by more than 44 points in economic tensions and by 48 points regarding racial and religious tension (Table 5). The standard deviation for political trust indicates that one third of the countries will be outside the range of 80 to 120.

Figure 21: Differences between countries on quality indexes



Note: Derived from results shown in Table 5.
Source: EQLS 2007

While there is a great variation between countries in their GDP per capita, popular satisfaction with the quality of public services varies much less. At the extreme, satisfaction is highest in Finland (124) and lowest in Bulgaria (74) (Figure 21). However, there is only an 11-point difference between the average evaluation in the EU15 Member States and the NMS. Moreover, four of the NMS have above-average levels of satisfaction with the quality of public services. At the same time, in three of the EU15 Member States – Italy, Greece and Portugal – satisfaction with public services is closer to that in Bulgaria than to the European average (Table 5). There is even less cross-national difference (28 points) in the evaluation of neighbourhoods. Cross-national differences for access to health services are even lower.

The EQLS shows that it is more realistic to think of 'countries with problems' rather than 'problem countries', because individual countries are not consistently above or below average on the indexes of quality of society and of public services. While some EU Member States have more problems than others, none can claim to be consistently high in its quality of society. Thus, instead of characterising countries in global terms, policymakers can use the EQLS findings in Table 5 and Figure 22 (see next section) to concentrate efforts on those issues where performance is below the EU average.

Policy pointers

Three groups of people are below the EU average for three or more aspects of quality of society: those who are materially worse off; people who live in culturally heterogeneous neighbourhoods; and those whose government tends to be corrupt. However, the groups most affected are not the same for every indicator, nor is the degree to which they are disadvantaged. To make comparisons, the measures of impact reported separately in previous chapters have been standardised according to a 10-point scale[14] (Figure 22). The following subsections describe the recommended policy pointers for the three groups of people – as just outlined – who are below the EU average for three or more aspects of quality of society.

[14] Impacts are standardised to a 10-point scale by dividing 10 by the number of units in each scale and multiplying the quotient by the impact initially reported in the multilevel model tables in Chapters 3–7. Thus, if a scale has only 3 points, as is the case for tensions, the impact scores are multiplied by 3.33.

Material deprivation

Any European who finds it fairly or very difficult to live on their income and is deprived of at least three out of six commonly enjoyed items – such as replacing worn out furniture or a week's holiday – is defined as badly off materially (see Anderson et al, 2009, pp. 8ff). This group is limited in size: 8% of people are found to be badly off in income and deprived; a further 14% are considered to be lacking on one or the other count. Those who are badly off consistently evaluate quality of society less favourably than those who are better off. Although all European citizens are supposed to have equality in treatment by public officials, for those experiencing material difficulties access to health services is 1.8 points lower on the standardised scale, while the quality of public services is rated lower by 1.4 points (Figure 22a). Poor services among this group are paralleled by a higher level of political distrust. Moreover, economic tensions are unevenly distributed: the scores in this respect are 1.6 points higher among those who are worst off compared with those who are best off materially.

Figure 22: Overview of major social influences on quality of society



Notes: Results show the standardised impact on a 10-point scale, where 0 is the EU average. For the calculation of standardised impact measures, see footnote 14.
Material influences are: income inadequacy, deprivation. Cultural influences are: the racial and cultural heterogeneity of neighbourhood; long-term citizenship; urban location; percentage of Muslims in population. Corruption indicators are based on the Transparency International CPI.
Source: EQLS 2007

Major policy implications that follow from this EQLS evidence include:

- boosting the income of the poorest people and relaxing means-tested charges for access to health services;
- training public officials to show, through their words and actions, more positive engagement with problems that low-income members of society have in dealing with public bureaucracies;
- scrutinising tax and tax expenditure policies for consistency with European norms and encouraging social partners to emphasise common interests of management and workers in response to economic recession.

Culturally mixed neighbourhoods

The EQLS analysis also finds that people living in culturally mixed neighbourhoods tend to evaluate quality of society less favourably than those living in areas where the country's traditional population dominates. Across Europe today, 87% of people are long-term citizens, since both their parents as well as they themselves were born in their country of residence. A majority of this group lives in a neighbourhood populated by people like themselves. However, almost one tenth of people live in neighbourhoods that are very mixed according to race and religion, while almost one third reside in neighbourhoods that are to some extent mixed. The same is true for two thirds of those whose attachment to the country does not extend across the generations.

In culturally mixed neighbourhoods, people's evaluation of their local services tends to be 1.5 points lower than the EU average (Figure 22b). This is not because the neighbourhoods are difficult for public agencies to reach – in fact, they are usually urban areas where public services are most readily delivered. While recent immigrants may tend to settle in more run-down neighbourhoods with cheaper housing, this does not justify public neglect. In short, immigrants call attention to neighbourhood deficiencies that have been cumulating over the years.

The EU is multi-ethnic and multi-confessional within a Christian context. It promotes programmes encouraging respect for the rights of minority groups that have long been resident in Europe. An unintended consequence of economic expansion and the free movement of persons has been an increase in immigration from countries outside the EU. The EQLS finds that racial and religious tensions are highest in prosperous countries that have attracted a relatively large percentage of Muslim immigrants. Tensions are driven not so much by physical proximity but by a more diffuse popular concern about the development of a multicultural society. The principle of subsidiarity recognises that there are some issues that require action at the European level – such as tensions arising from the transnational and intercontinental movement of people into the European public space, and the maintenance of the rights and freedom of all people in the EU.

In light of this, there are certain measures that must be addressed by national and local governments, as follows:

- where neighbourhoods have substandard services, service providers should give priority to preventing further deterioration and to raising standards to the norm for the city as a whole;
- governments should address racial, ethnic and religious tensions through policies that encourage migrants to develop a good understanding of national norms where they live – they should also encourage longstanding citizens to appreciate positive features of economic and cultural integration (European Parliament Policy Department, 2007).

Government corruption

Giving a higher financial priority to public policies designed to help disadvantaged people through education, job training and other means is important. However, how governments administer services also has a major impact on how citizens evaluate their quality of society and public services. The greater the transparency and lower the corruption in public administration, the more positive the evaluation of quality of society appears to be (Figure 22c). The standard measure of the integrity of public administration – the CPI of Transparency International – primarily reflects the behaviour of administrations allocating procurement contracts worth millions and of fundraisers for political parties and politicians. The extent of corruption shows the degree to which governments are unwilling or unable to enforce laws against their own elected and non-elected officials, as well as the extent to which they are likely to administer policies ineffectively.

Although relatively few people pay bribes for public services, corruption at the highest levels of government makes the public perceive all of government as corrupt (see Transparency International website; Mishler and Rose, 1997). Perceived corruption is the single biggest cause of distrust in political institutions. Moreover, whether citizens see their government as honest or corrupt has just as much impact as material conditions on how they rate public services and neighbourhood services (Figure 22).

Governors have a direct interest in promoting greater trust. This is particularly the case for EU institutions such as the European Central Bank, which requires trust in its monetary policies to produce the responses required to promote economic stability and growth. Corruption can also distort activities in the Single European Market through the counterfeiting of trademarks and certificates of origin.

The EU gives priority to preventing corruption in the disbursement of EU funds by national governments. Addressing this issue was a condition of admitting Bulgaria and Romania into the EU in 2007. However, the problem is not confined to just two countries. While most EU countries rank in the higher levels of the 10-point Transparency International CPI, a third of the countries fall below the midpoint of the index, representing one third of the EU's population.

Given the importance of transparency in this context, to improve quality of public services it is recommended that governments should strengthen anti-corruption policies and their enforcement in order to make their procedures more transparent.

Relevance of EQLS

The EQLS can provide a more nuanced picture of European citizens and society, consistent with the call of the European Commission (2009) to improve policymaking tools for 'measuring progress in a changing world'. The Commission emphasises the need for multiple measures of the quality of life, rather than relying on a single aggregate measure of material wealth – that is, GDP, which cannot show how benefits are distributed within a society or how members evaluate conditions that their government claims to improve. The Commission particularly stresses the development of 'robust direct measurements' of output – such as the quality of public services and the quality of life – to complement measures of inputs to social well-being such as public expenditure. This report has shown how quality of society and of public services can be evaluated in fields for which the EU and national governments take responsibility (Anderson et al, 2009).

On the whole, a score of '6' on a 10-point index scale is positive in terms of how the average European rates the quality of public services – nonetheless, it also indicates that more could be done to improve society and public services. The scepticism of many Europeans about political institutions is a sign

that people are neither pro nor anti-government but open to altering their evaluations in line with its performance. The EU's Open Method of Coordination offers a forum for governors to become better informed about policies to improve their performance. However, turning sceptics into more positive citizens requires actions as well as words.

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Annex:
Indicators used and data tables

Table A1: EQLS indicators used in analysis

	Minimum	Maximum	Average	Standard deviation
Indexes				
Question 56 Public services satisfaction	1 least	10 most	5.92	1.60
Question 47 Access to health services	1 very difficult	3 no difficulty	2.54	0.50
Question 54 Neighbourhood environment	1 many complaints	4 no complaints	3.38	0.62
Question 27 Political trust	1 least	10 most	4.90	1.97
Tensions between:				
Question 25(1)(2) Rich and poor, managers and workers	0 none	2 a lot	1.18	0.56
Question 25(5)(6) Different racial, religious groups	0 none	2 a lot	1.20	0.61
Question 25(3) Men and women	0 none	2 a lot	0.82	0.62
Question 25(4) Old and young	0 none	2 a lot	0.94	0.64
Economic factors				
Question 19 Number of deprivations	0	6	0.98	1.54
Question 57 Income adequacy	1 very difficult	6 very easy	3.86	1.26
HH2d Employed or self-employed	0 no	1 yes	0.52	0.50
Social and political factors				
HH2b Age	18 years	88+ years	47.21	17.77
Question 49 Further education: codes 4–6	0 no	1 yes	0.28	0.45
HH2a Female	0 no	1 yes	0.52	0.50
Question 20 Number of political contacts	0	3	0.35	0.70
Question 70 Long-term citizen	0 no	1 yes	0.87	0.33
Question 53 Mixed religion, race	0 homogeneous	2 mixed	0.56	0.69
Question 17 Number of housing problems	0 none	4+	0.59	0.94
Question 22 Church attendance	0 never	5 times at least/week	2.07	1.92
Question 52 Urban	0 no	1 yes	0.47	0.50
Regional economy as % EU average GDP	1 <50%	6 >125%	4.08	1.66
Transparency International CPI	3.7 most corrupt	9.4 least corrupt	6.51	1.78
GDP per capita, thousands of €, PPS (Eurostat, 2007)	9.3	38.0*	23.43	7.88
Gini coefficient (Eurostat, 2004)	22.5 least unequal	38 most unequal	29.02	4.41
Public expenditure on health, thousands of €, PPS/ inhabitant	0.31	3.78	1.48	0.87
% Muslims in population (excludes Bulgaria)	0.01	5.79	1.81	1.87
Non-EU immigrants in 2006, % population	0.00	1.14	0.34	0.27

Notes: Question numbers refer to those in the EQLS questionnaire (see Anderson et al, 2009, Annex 1). For details of indexes, see Chapters 3 to 7. Numerical results are for the EU27 Member States and weighted by population.
PPS = purchasing power standards.
* In multilevel models, to avoid a skewed distribution, the artificially high GDP per capita of Luxembourg (€66,300) was rounded up to just above the next highest national GDP.
Source: EQLS 2007

Table A2: Factor analyses for indexes

	Principal components			
	1	2	3	4
% variance accounted for:	29.6	14.0	9.4	8.8
Eigenvalue:	6.22	2.93	1.98	1.84
Trust				
Question 27(5) Trust in government	0.88	0.18	0.05	0.07
Question (1) Trust in parliament	0.87	0.17	0.04	0.08
Question 27(6) Trust in political parties	0.83	0.19	0.03	0.07
Question 27(2) Trust in legal system	0.80	0.20	0.09	0.10
Question 27(4) Trust in police	0.65	0.24	0.15	0.04
Public services				
Question 56(4) Public services: childcare	0.09	0.80	0.12	0.06
Question 56(5) Public services: care for elderly	0.11	0.79	0.12	0.06
Question 56(2) Public services: education	0.22	0.72	0.12	0.09
Question 56(3) Public services: public transport	0.14	0.70	0.07	0.10
Question 56(1) Public services: health	0.25	0.68	0.12	0.22
Question 56(6) Public services: state pensions	0.27	0.68	0.05	0.06
Neighbourhood services				
Question 54(2) Neighbourhood: air pollution	0.06	0.06	0.80	0.08
Question 54(6) Neighbourhood: litter or rubbish	0.08	0.10	0.76	0.04
Question 54(1) Neighbourhood: noise	0.04	0.03	0.75	0.06
Question 54(5) Neighbourhood: crime	0.09	0.06	0.74	0.10
Question 54(3) Neighbourhood: green areas	0.01	0.13	0.74	0.13
Question 54(4) Neighbourhood: water quality	0.07	0.17	0.63	0.12
Access to health services				
Question 47(2) Access to health services: appointment	0.07	0.09	0.09	0.83
Question 47(3) Access to health services: waiting time	0.07	0.12	0.10	0.81
Question 47(1) Access to health services: distance	0.03	0.07	0.08	0.71
Question 47(4) Access to health services: cost	0.13	0.14	0.17	0.68

Notes: Factors with eigenvalues of less than 1.0 are omitted. Varimax rotation.
Source: EQLS 2007

Table A3: Individual resources and quality of society indexes

	Income adequacy	Age	Education	Female	Urban	R^2 %
	(Beta values, OLS regressions)					
Public services	.26***	.03***	.02**	.00	.01*	6.9
Neighbourhood	.22***	.09***	.04***	-.01	-.24***	11.5
Crime	-.15***	-.05***	-.03***	.00	.23***	7.8
Health services	.21***	.00	.10***	-0.03***	.00	6.6
Trust in political institutions	.25***	.06***	.10***	.01*	-.01	8.9
Trust in most people	.18***	.03***	.12***	.00	.00	5.5

Notes: *** significant at .001 level.
** significant at .01 level.
* significant at .05 level.
Source: EQLS 2007

Table A4: Evaluation of each public service, by country

	Health services	Education system	Public transport	Childcare	Care for elderly	State pensions	Index average	Standard deviation
FI	7.6	8.4	7.3	7.9	6.7	7.0	7.5	1.0
LU	7.4	6.4	7.6	7.1	6.9	7.2	7.2	1.5
MT	7.0	7.8	6.1	7.8	7.6	6.1	7.0	1.6
AT	7.8	7.5	7.2	7.0	6.3	5.8	7.0	1.5
BE	7.7	7.4	6.9	6.9	6.6	6.1	7.0	1.2
DK	7.0	7.6	6.8	7.4	6.5	6.4	7.0	1.4
SE	7.6	7.4	6.8	7.6	6.1	5.6	6.9	1.3
NL	7.2	6.9	6.5	6.8	6.4	6.7	6.8	1.0
FR	7.1	6.5	6.7	6.3	5.6	5.2	6.3	1.2
CZ	6.4	7.2	6.4	7.1	5.7	4.3	6.2	1.4
ES	6.8	6.5	6.5	6.1	5.6	5.1	6.2	1.4
EE	6.0	6.8	6.7	6.5	5.6	5.3	6.2	1.4
UK	6.5	6.6	6.3	6.3	5.8	4.9	6.1	1.6
SI	5.8	6.8	5.8	7.1	6.2	4.9	6.1	1.5
EU15	**6.4**	**6.3**	**6.4**	**6.2**	**5.7**	**5.0**	**6.0**	**1.5**
DE	6.0	5.8	6.6	6.3	6.1	4.5	5.9	1.6
IE	4.9	7.3	5.7	5.6	5.6	5.7	5.9	1.7
SK	5.8	6.7	6.0	6.6	5.4	4.6	5.9	1.5
LT	5.2	6.1	6.7	6.6	5.0	4.4	5.7	1.7
PL	5.0	6.4	6.3	6.4	5.1	4.4	5.6	1.6
CY	5.9	6.6	3.8	6.2	5.5	4.8	5.5	1.6
NMS12	**5.3**	**6.2**	**6.1**	**6.1**	**5.0**	**4.2**	**5.5**	**1.7**
HU	5.1	5.9	5.8	5.7	5.4	4.2	5.4	1.7
IT	5.3	5.5	5.5	5.4	5.1	5.0	5.3	1.5
RO	5.5	5.9	6.3	5.3	4.4	4.2	5.3	1.9
LV	5.0	5.9	6.1	5.6	4.4	3.4	5.0	1.6
PT	4.9	5.4	5.7	5.6	4.8	3.3	5.0	1.5
EL	4.9	5.1	6.0	5.0	4.2	3.3	4.8	1.7
BG	4.7	4.9	5.3	4.6	3.4	2.7	4.5	1.6
EU27	**6.1**	**6.6**	**6.3**	**6.4**	**5.6**	**5.0**	**5.9**	**1.6**

Note: Index gives each individual's average response to the six public service questions in the EQLS. Replies are based on a 10-point scale, where 1 = 'very poor quality' and 10 = 'very high quality'.
Source: EQLS 2007

Table A5: Multilevel model of Public Services Index

	B coefficient	Standard error	T-ratio	P	Impact
Transparency International CPI	.23	.05	4.54	.000	1.31
Gini coefficient (Eurostat, 2004)	-.05	.02	-1.82	.081	ns
Regional economy, % EU average GDP	.01	.02	.54	.586	ns
Urban	.00	.05	-.08	.936	ns
Further education	-.12	.04	-3.25	.002	-.12
Female	-.01	.02	-.64	.523	ns
Age	.00	.00	.67	.506	ns
Income adequacy	.22	.02	13.36	.000	1.12
Number of deprivations	-.05	.01	-3.71	.000	-.29
Long-term citizen	-.21	.06	-3.69	.000	-.21
Mixed religion, race	-.04	.02	-1.78	.075	ns
Number of political contacts	-.10	.02	-4.60	.000	-.29
Church attendance	.05	.01	5.09	.000	.26
Variance accounted for (Pseudo R^2):	19.4%				

Notes: Results are for EU27 Member States and are weighted equally; sample comprises 31,390 respondents. Impact is calculated as the b coefficient multiplied by the range of each independent variable; ns = not significant.
Source: EQLS 2007

Table A6: Multilevel model of Neighbourhood Services Index

	B coefficient	Standard error	T-ratio	P	Impact
Transparency International CPI	.08	.02	3.57	.002	.48
Gini coefficient (Eurostat, 2004)	.00	.01	-.70	.494	ns
Urban	-.29	.04	-7.78	.000	-.29
Regional economy, % EU average GDP	-.01	.02	-.88	.382	ns
Age	.00	.00	5.65	.000	.14
Female	-.02	.01	-2.51	.012	-.02
Further education	-.02	.02	-1.55	.122	ns
Income adequacy	.04	.01	6.26	.000	.20
Number of deprivations	-.01	.01	-1.89	.059	ns
Mixed religion, race	-.14	.01	-10.79	.000	-.28
Long-term citizen	-.04	.02	-1.96	.050	-.04
Number of political contacts	-.06	.01	-5.56	.000	-.17
Number of housing problems	-.05	.01	-5.81	.000	-.22
Church attendance	.001	.003	-.37	.712	ns
Variance accounted for (Pseudo R^2):	20.4%				

Notes: Results are for EU27 Member States and are weighted equally; sample comprises 30,607 respondents. Neighbourhood Services Index shows the average response to six neighbourhood questions. Impact is calculated as the b coefficient multiplied by the range; ns = not significant.
Source: EQLS 2007

Figure A1: Scores for Access to Health Services Index, by country



Notes: Index gives each individual's average response to the four questions on access to health services after exclusion of 'don't know' answers and of those who say they have not accessed a health service. Responses are given on a 3-point scale, where 1 = 'very difficult' and 3 = 'no difficulty'.
Source: EQLS 2007

Table A7: Multilevel model of Access to Health Services Index

	B coefficient	Standard error	T-ratio	P	Impact
Gini coefficient (Eurostat, 2004)	-0.01	0.01	-1.66	0.111	ns
Public spending on health, thousands of €, PPS/inhabitant	0.01	0.03	0.22	0.832	ns
Urban	0.01	0.01	1.26	0.210	ns
Regional economy, % EU average GDP	0.01	0.01	1.48	0.140	ns
Female gender	-0.03	0.01	-5.35	0.000	-0.03
Age	0.00	0.00	-1.29	0.197	ns
Further education	0.01	0.01	1.18	0.239	ns
Number of deprivations	-0.04	0.00	-10.67	0.000	-0.25
Income adequacy	0.05	0.01	10.28	0.000	0.27
Employed or self-employed	0.01	0.01	1.39	0.166	ns
Mixed religion, race	-0.02	0.01	-2.29	0.022	-0.03
Long-term citizen	0.01	0.01	0.44	0.657	ns
Number of political contacts	-0.02	0.01	-3.01	0.003	-0.05
Church attendance	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.999	ns
Variance accounted (Pseudo R^2):	10.9%				

Notes: Results are weighted equally; sample comprises 25,761 respondents.
Malta is excluded because of missing data for public spending on health.
Impact is calculated as the b coefficient multiplied by the range.
PPS = purchasing power standards.
ns = not significant.
Source: EQLS 2007

Table A8: Relationship between trust and multilevel models

	B coefficient	Standard error	T-ratio	P	Impact
Trust in political institutions					
Transparency International CPI	.34	.06	5.85	.000	1.92
Gini coefficient (Eurostat, 2004)	-.03	.02	-1.15	.263	ns
Urban	-.04	.04	-.99	.321	ns
Regional economy, % EU average GDP	.03	.02	1.13	.259	ns
Further education	.18	.05	3.48	.001	.18
Age	.00	.00	2.95	.004	.35
Female gender	.02	.03	.62	.537	ns
Income adequacy	.23	.02	1.31	.000	1.13
Number of deprivations	-.07	.02	-3.94	.000	-.45
Long-term citizen	-.25	.07	-3.43	.001	-.25
Mixed religion, race	-.06	.02	-2.57	.010	-.11
Church attendance	.11	.02	6.66	.000	.56
Number of political contacts	.05	.03	1.58	.115	ns
Variance accounted (Pseudo R^2):	21.6%				
Trust in most people					
Transparency International CPI	.24	.10	2.54	.018	1.39
Gini coefficient (Eurostat, 2004)	-.04	.02	-1.66	.111	ns
Urban	-.01	.05	-.17	.869	ns
Regional economy, % EU average GDP	.00	.03	.01	.989	ns
Further education	.32	.06	5.53	.000	.32
Age	.00	.00	.80	.426	ns
Female gender	-.02	.03	-.54	.590	ns
Income adequacy	.21	.02	8.93	.000	1.03
Number of deprivations	-.13	.01	-9.40	.000	-.79
Long-term citizen	.07	.07	.97	.332	ns
Mixed religion, race	-.10	.04	-2.91	.004	-.21
Church attendance	.05	.01	3.32	.001	.25
Number of political contacts	.15	.03	5.88	.000	.45
Variance accounted (Pseudo R^2):	13.6%				

Notes: Results are weighted equally; sample comprises 31,299 respondents. Political Trust Index shows the average response to five political trust questions.
Impact is calculated as the b coefficient multiplied by the range.
ns = not significant.
Source: EQLS 2007

Table A9: Factor analysis of tensions

	2007		2003	2007*
	Factor 1	Factor 2		
Variance explained, %:	47.4	16.7	53.1	55.1
Eigenvalues	2.84	1.00	2.12	2.20
		Loadings		
Poor and rich	.77	.12	.74	.76
Managers and workers	.77	.13	.72	.75
Men and women	.69	.24	.73	.74
Old and young	.66	.27	.72	.72
Religious groups	.19	.88	–	–
Racial/ethnic groups	.22	.87	–	–

Notes: * Reduced to four services to match the number of variables in the 2003 EQLS questionnaire.
Factors with eigenvalues of less than 1.0 are omitted. Varimax rotation.
Source: EQLS 2003 and 2007

Table A10: Relationship between individual resources and economic tensions

	Economic tensions (average score)
Adequate income	
Yes	1.1
No	1.3
Third-level education	
Yes	1.1
No	1.2
Age	
Young	1.2
Old	1.1
Gender	
Female	1.2
Male	1.2

Note: A score of 2 represents 'a lot of tension', 1 'some tension' and 0 'no feeling of tension'.
Source: EQLS 2007

Table A11: Scores for Economic Tensions Index, by country

	A lot of tension, rich and poor (%)	A lot of tension, management and workers (%)	A lot of tension, both counts (%)	Average index	Standard deviation
HU	71	63	56	1.6	.50
FR	43	44	27	1.4	.50
SI	35	46	28	1.3	.51
LT	47	34	28	1.3	.53
DE	36	42	26	1.3	.57
CZ	40	34	23	1.3	.55
EL	36	46	26	1.2	.62
NMS12	**38**	**34**	**25**	**1.2**	**.58**
PL	34	31	20	1.2	.54
RO	37	34	27	1.2	.63
LU	32	37	21	1.2	.58
SK	31	27	19	1.2	.54
EU15	**28**	**32**	**19**	**1.2**	**.55**
EE	31	20	13	1.2	.48
IT	28	31	18	1.2	.54
ES	24	34	20	1.1	.61
PT	23	26	17	1.1	.57
BE	24	22	10	1.1	.51
LV	32	16	14	1.1	.54
NL	12	19	6	1.0	.41
UK	17	20	9	1.0	.50
FI	13	14	5	1.0	.41
BG	27	17	13	1.0	.58
IE	18	18	9	1.0	.54
AT	20	16	9	1.0	.53
SE	11	7	3	1.0	.38
MT	13	18	8	.9	.58
CY	11	12	7	.8	.52
DK	4	4	1	.7	.45
EU27	**30**	**32**	**20**	**1.1**	**.56**

Note: Economic Tensions Index gives each individual's average response to the questions about tension between rich and poor, and between management and workers.
Source: EQLS 2007

Table A12: Multilevel model of Economic Tensions Index

	B coefficient	Standard error	T-ratio	P	Impact
GDP per capita, thousands of €, PPS (Eurostat, 2007)	.00	.01	.66	.516	ns
Gini coefficient (Eurostat, 2004)	.00	.01	.23	.823	ns
Regional economy, % EU average GDP	-.03	.01	-4.98	.000	-.15
Urban	.00	.01	-.04	.971	ns
Income adequacy	-.05	.01	-8.26	.000	-.25
Number of deprivations	.03	.01	6.02	.000	.19
Employed or self-employed	.01	.01	1.07	.286	ns
Age	.00	.00	-3.66	.000	-.10
Female gender	.04	.01	3.62	.001	.04
Further education	.00	.01	-.38	.701	ns
Long-term citizen	.04	.02	2.37	.018	.04
Mixed religion, race	.02	.01	1.55	.120	ns
Number of political contacts	.03	.01	5.95	.000	.10
Church attendance	-.01	.00	-3.48	.001	-.06
Variance accounted (Pseudo R^2):	4.8%				

Notes: Results are weighted equally; sample comprises 30,946 respondents.
Impact is calculated as the b coefficient multiplied by the range of each independent variable.
PPS = purchasing power standards.
ns = not significant.
Source: EQLS 2007

Table A13: Racial and religious tensions, by country

	Race, ethnicity	Religion	Tensions index*
NL	58	40	1.4
IT	54	46	1.4
FR	53	40	1.4
AT	42	41	1.4
UK	42	33	1.3
SE	37	31	1.3
EU15	**42**	**34**	**1.3**
BE	44	31	1.3
DK	36	32	1.2
DE	33	32	1.2
CZ	53	25	1.2
HU	50	22	1.1
SI	30	22	1.1
ES	34	23	1.1
IE	34	20	1.1
FI	33	16	1.1
MT	43	18	1.1
LU	37	23	1.1
EL	36	22	1.0
RO	30	19	1.0
CY	23	14	1.0
NMS12	**28**	**17**	**0.9**
PL	19	17	0.9
SK	22	10	0.9
PT	22	13	0.9
EE	20	7	0.8
LT	16	13	0.8
BG	12	8	0.7
LV	15	7	0.6
EU27	**39**	**31**	**1.2**

Note: Results show the proportion of people feeling 'a lot of tension'. * Combined score on feeling tension on both measures: 2 = 'a lot of tension'; 0 = 'no tension'.
Source: EQLS 2007

Table A14: Multilevel model of racial and religious tensions

	B coefficient	Standard error	T-ratio	P	Impact
GDP per capita, thousands of €, PPS (Eurostat, 2007)	0.01	0.00	2.76	0.012	0.30
% of Muslims in population	0.06	0.01	5.62	0.000	0.35
Non-EU immigrants in 2006, % population	0.00	0.08	0.01	0.995	ns
Regional economy, % EU average GDP	-0.01	0.01	-0.76	0.449	ns
Urban	0.00	0.02	-0.09	0.930	ns
Age	-0.003	0.00	-6.28	0.000	-0.26
Female gender	0.07	0.01	5.53	0.000	0.07
Further education	-0.03	0.01	-1.73	0.083	ns
Income adequacy	-0.03	0.01	-6.03	0.000	-0.15
Number of deprivations	-0.01	0.00	-1.72	0.086	ns
Employed or self-employed	0.01	0.01	0.46	0.642	ns
Long-term citizen	0.07	0.02	3.74	0.000	0.07
Mixed religion, race	0.02	0.01	2.00	0.046	0.04
Number of political contacts	0.02	0.01	3.17	0.002	0.07
Church attendance	-0.01	0.00	-3.79	0.000	-0.07
Variance accounted (Pseudo R^2):	8.6%				

Notes: Results are weighted equally; sample comprises 29,098 respondents.
Bulgaria is excluded because of its large indigenous Muslim population.
PPS = purchasing power standards.
ns = not significant.
Source: EQLS 2007

Table A15: Multilevel model of gender tension

	B coefficient	Standard error	T-ratio	P	Impact
Transparency International CPI	0.04	0.02	1.86	0.074	ns
Gini coefficient (Eurostat, 2004)	0.00	0.01	0.26	0.800	ns
Urban	0.00	0.01	-0.04	0.969	ns
Regional economy, % EU average GDP	-0.01	0.01	-0.93	0.351	ns
Female gender	0.09	0.01	7.57	0.000	0.09
Age	0.00	0.00	-1.97	0.049	-0.06
Further education	-0.02	0.01	-1.65	0.099	ns
Income adequacy	-0.03	0.01	-5.04	0.000	-0.16
Number of deprivations	0.02	0.00	3.89	0.000	0.09
Employed or self-employed	0.02	0.01	1.72	0.085	ns
Mixed religion, race	0.01	0.01	1.76	0.077	ns
Long-term citizen	0.04	0.03	1.35	0.177	ns
Number of political contacts	0.02	0.01	2.45	0.014	0.05
Church attendance	0.00	0.00	-0.22	0.823	ns
Variance accounted (Pseudo R^2):	0.9%				

Notes: Results are weighted equally; sample comprises 30,485 respondents.
ns = not significant.
Source: EQLS 2007

Table A16: Multilevel model of tensions between young and old people

	B coefficient	Standard error	T-ratio	P	Impact
Transparency International CPI	0.02	0.02	0.83	0.415	ns
Gini coefficient (Eurostat, 2004)	0.00	0.01	0.15	0.885	ns
Urban	0.04	0.02	2.12	0.034	0.04
Regional economy, % EU average GDP	-0.02	0.01	-2.09	0.036	-0.09
Female gender	0.07	0.01	5.54	0.000	0.07
Age	0.00	0.00	-0.26	0.796	ns
Further education	-0.03	0.01	-2.00	0.045	-0.03
Income adequacy	-0.03	0.01	-5.61	0.000	-0.16
Number of deprivations	0.02	0.01	3.41	0.001	0.11
Employed or self-employed	0.00	0.01	0.43	0.671	ns
Mixed religion, race	0.02	0.01	2.10	0.035	0.05
Long-term citizen	0.04	0.02	1.76	0.078	ns
Number of political contacts	0.02	0.01	2.85	0.005	0.07
Church attendance	0.00	0.00	-0.34	0.737	ns
Variance accounted (Pseudo R^2):	0.9%				

Notes: Results are weighted equally; sample comprises 30,761 respondents.
ns = not significant.
Source: EQLS 2007

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