The bargaining process over the new collective agreements approved in Denmark in March 2000 appears to have restored the confidence between top and bottom of the trade union movement, which had been badly shaken by the major industrial dispute of 1998. At the same time, the new agreements mark a renewed importance for the central social partner organisations - the Confederation of Danish Trade Unions (LO) and the Danish Employers' Confederation (DA) - which had been losing ground to the sectoral organisations, especially the Confederation of Danish Industries (Dansk Industri) and the Central Organisation of Industrial Employees in Denmark (CO-Industri).
Following an extremely peaceful 2000 collective bargaining round, in February 2000 the Public Conciliator drew up an overall compromise settlement for the entire bargaining area covered by the Confederation of Danish Trade Unions (Landsorganisationen i Danmark, LO) and the Danish Employers' Confederation (Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening, DA) (DK0002167F). The compromise contained the key features of the deals reached initially in the industry sector (DK0002166N) and subsequently elsewhere: five extra days of "flexible" leave per year (constituting a sixth week of annual leave); improvements in occupational pension schemes; and a four-year duration. The overall proposed settlement was put to a single vote among DA and LO members.
The whole carefully planned and implemented bargaining process reached a perfect conclusion - from the point of view of the negotiators - when the Public Conciliator, Asbjørn Jensen, published the results of the voting on the compromise settlement on 7 March. As expected, both DA and LO members had approved the settlement. Notably, with over 80% voting in favour, on an acceptable turn-out of just over 40%, the LO members backed up their negotiators. This apparent declaration of confidence was even clearer than the vote of no confidence given to the negotiators' compromise in the previous bargaining round in 1998, when 55% of LO members voted against the compromise - leading to major industrial disputes lasting for 11 days and ended only by government intervention (DK9805168F).
It was very much the social partners themselves that contributed to avoiding a repetition of the 1998 situation (DK0002168F). From the very start, and during the entire process, the social partners effectively tried to keep down the level of expectations (DK9912160F), partly by the indirect announcement through the tripartite statistical committee of a framework of annual cost increases of about 3% (DK9910150F), and partly by a precise and moderate announcement of the main demands, as well as caution in making comments on the demands of the other side. A characteristic example was the announcement of the demands for extra days of leave and improvements in occupational pension schemes made by the Danish Metalworkers' Union (Dansk Metal) and the industry section of the General Workers' Union in Denmark (Specialarbejderforbundet i Danmark, SiD), prior to the negotiations in the industry sector between the Confederation of Danish Industries (Dansk Industri, DI) and the Central Organisation of Industrial Employees in Denmark (Centralorganisationen af industriansatte, CO-industri). It was in this sector that 2000's trend-setting agreement was reached.
It is clearly easier to obtain the approval of members in a subsequent ballot when the demands earlier announced as main claims are actually met in the negotiations. In this case, a key point was that the announcement of the unions' demands took place on the basis of priorities drawn up through direct contacts between the main negotiators and the members in the form of meetings in all parts of the country. These meetings were also used to test attitudes to the idea of a longer agreement period.
The result of the ballot
This strengthening of the lines of communication between top and bottom in the trade unions may be seen as being reflected in the very large majority in favour of the Conciliator's compromise. It can thus be said that the trust which suffered a serious blow in 1998 has now been restored. It should be noted that in past ballots there has generally been a relatively small gap between the number of "yes" votes and "no" votes among skilled and unskilled workers in industry, and that there has often been a majority of "no" votes in SiD. In some cases, a majority for a compromise has been obtained only because of the massive majority in favour which is the general rule in the field covered by the Union of Commercial and Clerical Employees (Handels- og Kontorfunktionærernes Forbund, HK). This time there was no need for assistance from these more "moderate" white-collar workers: the majority in favour of the deal was 75% in SiD's industry section and about 85% in Dansk Metal. These are quite exceptional figures - in particular for SiD.
In the 2000 ballot, no single LO-affiliated federation recorded a majority vote against the compromise. Such a "no" majority was found only among specific groups within the big federations. Unsurprisingly - considering the recent unrest among bus drivers (DK0001169N) - there was a majority of "no" votes in SiD's transport group. It was in transport and other bargaining areas operating the so-called "standard wage system" that there was the greatest scepticism about a four-year agreement, because in such sectors there is, in principle, no right to negotiate wages at the local level during the period of the sectoral agreement (in practice this right does exist, though in a very restricted form). Thus it could be said to be surprising that the "no" majority in SiD's transport group was as narrow as 51% to 49%.
HK as a whole recorded an 85% "yes" vote, and even within its industry section (HK/Industri), where there had been problems in the bargaining process - there was an overall 71% vote in favour. However, this figure masks significant differences, with a marked majority in favour among those white-collar staff covered by an agreement with DI (where a compromise was reached in joint negotiations conducted through the CO-Industri cartel) and a majority against the compromise in other fields where HK/Industri failed to reach agreement with the employers and where the Public Conciliator had to step in and dictate the result. This applied, for instance, to white-collar employees in the textiles and clothing, building industry and graphical industries (DK0002167F). This illustrates how important it is for acceptance of a settlement that the two sides themselves reach a result through negotiations.
Will the stability pact last?
It was the long agreement period - a virtually unprecedented four years - which made it possible to reach an acceptable result in the central-level negotiations and which thus eliminated the imbalance between the local and central level which contributed to the industrial dispute in 1998. On the basis of the agreement reached in the industry sector, the prospects for lasting peace on the labour market are considered to be relatively bright. However, there is no guarantee that a four-year "stability pact" at the central level will automatically lead to peace at the local level during the same period. Economic and political changes may undermine the agreement result and lead to an increase in the number of local disputes. Seen from the employers' side, this is the reverse side of the decentralisation coin. The employers have wished to decentralise negotiations in order to meet enterprises' needs for a higher degree of flexibility. However, when negotiations about pay, working time and other issues are transferred to enterprise level, any possible conflicting interests between the two sides are transferred as well.
Commentary
Despite these concerns about possible local conflicts, as the political and economic conditions are relatively stable in Denmark at present there are still good prospects of the expected industrial peace prevailing over the country. It is certainly true that the two central organisations, DA and LO, are now - after the central role they played during the dispute in 1998 - experiencing a renaissance as coordinating parties in the collective bargaining process. From the early 1990s when the new players - the major sectoral organisations, Dansk Industri and CO-Industri - entered the field, there was a clear trend towards reducing the importance of the central level, but after the bargaining rounds in 1998 and 2000, this trend has become less clear (DK9910151F). However, it should be added that the peaceful conclusion of the new collective agreements in 2000 cannot be seen exclusively as a result achieved by the central organisations. It should also be seen as a result of the efforts on the part of the sectoral organisations to avoid a repetition of the unfortunate circumstances which led to widespread disputes in 1998. This applies, in particular, to the two big organisations in the trend-setting industry sector, Dansk Industri and CO-industri. (Jørgen Steen Madsen, FAOS)