Razvoj na področju dohodkovne neenakosti in srednjega razreda v EU

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Authors

Abstract

To poročilo vsebuje celovit pregled trendov v zvezi z dohodkovno neenakostjo v državah članicah EU in med njimi od leta 2006 do leta 2021. Študija želi odgovoriti tudi na s tem povezano vprašanje, ali se srednji razred zmanjšuje zaradi večjih razlik v razpoložljivem dohodku gospodinjstev. Na podlagi širokega spektra medsebojno povezanih kazalnikov, vključno z dohodkovno neenakostjo, ravnmi dohodka po državah članicah in po porazdelitvi dohodka, velikostjo srednjega razreda, deležem nacionalnega dohodka, ki ga prejmejo različne dohodkovne skupine, ter stopnjami revščine in drugimi kazalniki gospodarskih težav, s katerimi se srečujejo evropska gospodinjstva, je bila izvedena obsežna analiza. Prav tako je bila proučena vloga javnih politik pri pojasnjevanju nekaterih od teh trendov. Rezultati kažejo, da čeprav je bila dohodkovna neenakost v državah članicah v povprečju razmeroma stabilna, so trendi na ravni držav članic veliko bolj mešani, velikost srednjega razreda pa se je v večini držav zmanjšala.

Developments in income inequality and the middle class in the EU

English (2.1 MB - PDF)

Key messages

Dohodkovna neenakost se je povečala v približno polovici držav članic (znatno v številnih državah članicah iz obdobja pred letom 2004) , v drugi polovici pa se je zmanjšala (zlasti v srednji in vzhodni Evropi). Vendar je neenakost v razpoložljivem dohodku gospodinjstev v zadnjih 15 letih v državah članicah EU v povprečju ostala razmeroma stabilna.
Dohodkovna neenakost po vsej EU se je med letoma 2006 in 2021 znatno zmanjšala. K temu je pripomogla izjemna rast dohodka v večini srednje- in vzhodnoevropskih držav, kar je privedlo do močne dohodkovne konvergence med državami članicami.
Dokazi o krčenju srednjega razreda obstajajo v skoraj dveh tretjinah držav članic. Vendar analiza ne kaže splošnega znatnega zmanjšanja srednjega razreda, ki predstavlja od 51 % do 75 % prebivalstva držav članic EU.
V dveh tretjinah držav članic se je povečal delež ljudi, ki živijo pod pragom revščine. Ta del prebivalstva je kriza življenjskih stroškov najhuje prizadela.
Socialna država ima pomembno vlogo pri zmanjševanju tržne dohodkovne neenakosti, saj jo v povprečju zmanjša za 42 % v vseh državah. Oslabitev socialnih držav je v nekaterih državah članicah prispevala k povečevanju dohodkovne neenakosti.

Executive summary

Javnost je mnenja, da se neenakost povečuje in da se srednji razred zmanjšuje. V tej študiji so analizirani empirični dokazi, pridobljeni v 15 letih, da se pojasni veljavnost tega stališča. Študija vsebuje celovito sliko dohodkovnih razlik v državah članicah EU in med njimi od leta 2006 do 2021 ter pokriva širok nabor medsebojno povezanih kazalnikov, ki zajemajo dohodkovno neenakost, srednji razred, stopnjo dohodkovne polarizacije in vlogo javnih politik pri teh trendih. V njej je obravnavan učinek velike recesije in pandemije covida-19 na dohodkovno neenakost ter zagotovljen vpogled v učinek zgodnjih faz krize življenjskih stroškov z uporabo podatkov za leto 2022 o materialnih težavah, s katerimi so se srečevala evropska gospodinjstva.

Ozadje politike

Po letih, ko je bila neenakost v političnih razpravah odrinjena na stranski tir, medtem ko so si morali evropski trgi dela po veliki recesiji opomoči, se je po pandemiji covida-19 in posledični krizi življenjskih stroškov ponovno znašla v ospredju. Vse večja neenakost in zmanjševanje srednjega razreda sta v javni razpravi vzbudila zaskrbljenost, saj tovrstna dogajanja ogrožajo kohezijo evropskih družb.

Med pandemijo so bili vzpostavljeni podporni ukrepi za ohranitev delovnih mest in pomoč družinam pri obvladovanju posledic omejitev gibanja, zlasti prek shem za ohranitev delovnih mest (in sistemov za podporo minimalnega dohodka), ki so jih omogočile odstopne klavzule iz fiskalnih pravil EU.

Po pandemiji so cene energije začele strmo naraščati. Posredni učinki so inflacijo postopoma potisnili navzgor, kar je privedlo do krize življenjskih stroškov. Ta je spodbudila vlade k izvajanju politik, ki naj bi najranljivejšim gospodinjstvom pomagale, da se spoprimejo s slabšanjem finančnega položaja.

Trgi dela in njihove institucije so v osnovi nacionalni, vendar je sprejetje pristopa na ravni EU za spremljanje dohodkovne neenakosti ključnega pomena zaradi vse večjega povezovanja EU in širitve proti vzhodu od sredine 2000-ih let.

Ključne ugotovitve

Dohodkovna neenakost po vsej EU se je med letoma 2006 in 2021 znatno zmanjšala. K temu je v celoti prispevala močna dohodkovna konvergenca med državami članicami EU. Povprečna dohodkovna neenakost v državah članicah je na splošno ostala podobna.
To konvergenco je mogoče pojasniti z izjemno rastjo dohodkov v državah članicah, ki so se EU pridružile s širitvijo leta 2004 (EU-13), in počasnim napredkom (ali celo upadom) v številnih državah, ki so bile članice pred letom 2004 (EU-14). V nasprotju z državami srednje in vzhodne Evrope se ravni dohodkov v sredozemskih državah na splošno niso uskladile z državami članicami z višjim dohodkom.
Stabilnost povprečne dohodkovne neenakosti med državami prikriva različne trende. Dohodkovna neenakost se je povečala v približno polovici držav članic, zlasti v več nordijskih in celinskih državah (med njimi na Švedskem in Danskem, ki sta bili pred tem veliko bolj enakopravni), medtem ko se je zmanjšala v nekaj več kot polovici držav, predvsem v več srednje- in vzhodnoevropskih ter sredozemskih državah (med njimi v Romuniji, na Portugalskem, v Grčiji, na Poljskem in Hrvaškem, ki so bile na začetku veliko bolj neenake).
Eden od dejavnikov, ki spodbujajo dohodkovno neenakost, je povečevanje razlik v plačah (ki se je pojavilo v približno polovici držav članic), drugi pa oslabitev prerazporeditvene vloge družine v večini držav. Po drugi strani so naraščajoče stopnje zaposlenosti (in aktivnosti) v večini držav zmanjšale neenakost, kot tudi prispevek socialne države pri blaženju neenakosti v tržnem dohodku (dohodek gospodinjstva pred upoštevanjem davkov in dajatev), čeprav je oslabitev socialnih držav v nekaterih državah prispevala k povečanju neenakosti.
Rast ravni dohodka v EU-13 je bila v številnih primerih močnejša med prejemniki nižjih dohodkov, kar je zmanjšalo dohodkovno neenakost. Najbolj pozitivni primeri so države srednje in vzhodne Evrope, čeprav to ni veljalo za vse, saj je imela velika recesija še posebej močan vpliv na baltske države in druge države članice EU-13 v sredozemski regiji.
Po drugi strani pa je zmernejša rast dohodka v EU-14, zlasti med osebami z najnižjimi dohodki, privedla do vse večje dohodkovne neenakosti (in zmanjševanja srednjega razreda). To se je zgodilo v nordijskih državah in večini celinskih držav. V sredozemskih držav je slika najslabša zaradi dolgotrajnih učinkov velike recesije na njihove trge dela.
Bistvena razlika med veliko recesijo in pandemijo covida-19 je bil usklajen odziv politike v EU-27 med pandemijo, zaradi katerega so se stopnje zaposlenosti znižale bolj zmerno in v manj državah kot med veliko recesijo, nadaljnja rast dohodka v večini držav (čeprav bolj zmerna kot pred pandemijo) in manj znatno povečanje dohodkovne neenakosti (kljub povečanju v približno polovici držav).
Socialna država ima ključno vlogo pri blaženju učinka tržne dohodkovne neenakosti, saj jo po upoštevanju socialnih prejemkov in davkov v državah članicah v povprečju ublaži za približno 42 %.
Velik srednji razred je značilen za evropske države, saj vključuje večino prebivalstva v vseh državah članicah in je odraz vključujoče družbe. Velikost srednjega razreda se je zmanjšala v skoraj dveh tretjinah držav članic, vendar analiza ne kaže splošnega znatnega zmanjšanja srednjega razreda. Ljudje z nizko stopnjo izobrazbe, mladi in brezposelni vse težje vstopajo v srednji razred.
Delež oseb pod pragom revščine (60 % mediane dohodka) se je med letoma 2006 in 2021 povečal v dveh tretjinah držav članic, kar je skladno z zmanjšanjem velikosti srednjega razreda in odraža premik iz srednjega razreda v razred z nizkimi dohodki v številnih državah.
Najboljši pokazatelj zgodnjega vpliva krize življenjskih stroškov v letu 2022 je bil večji delež gospodinjstev, ki svojih domov niso mogla ustrezno ogrevati, saj so se cene energije v letu 2022 povečale precej nad povprečno inflacijo. Najbolj so bila prizadeta najbolj prekarna gospodinjstva, zlasti ljudje z nizko stopnjo izobrazbe, mladi, ženske in tisti, ki živijo v gospodinjstvih z eno odraslo osebo (zlasti z otroki).

Smernice politike

Eno od glavnih orodij, ki so na voljo oblikovalcem politik za zmanjšanje dohodkovne neenakosti, je močna socialna država. Zato se mora politika za odpravljanje dohodkovne neenakosti osredotočiti na krepitev prerazdelitvene vloge sistemov socialne zaščite, zlasti v tistih državah članicah, kjer je oslabitev te vloge prispevala k povečanju dohodkovne neenakosti.
Močna socialna država je zlasti pomembna v času upada gospodarske rasti. V primeru pandemije covida-19 je izjemno povečanje sredstev, dodeljenih socialnim prejemkom v letih 2020 in 2021, zlasti prek nadomestil za brezposelnost za financiranje shem za ohranjanje delovnih mest, preprečilo bolj negativen učinek na evropske trge dela.
Oblikovalci politik bi se morali zavedati, da je treba pri oblikovanju politik socialnih prejemkov doseči najbolj prikrajšane skupine, saj številni prejemniki z najnižjimi dohodki ne morejo dostopati do ugodnosti, ki jih potrebujejo.
Večina držav mora sisteme socialnih prejemkov preoblikovati, da bi postali bolj progresivni. Prerazporeditev dohodka v večjem obsegu bi izboljšala sposobnost socialne države, da ublaži dohodkovno neenakost na trgu. Davki na premoženje, ki so v večini držav zanemarljivi, bi zagotovili več sredstev za takšno prerazporeditev.
Za oblikovalce politik bi moral položaj ljudi na dnu dohodkovne porazdelitve v zadnjih letih pomeniti vir zaskrbljenosti. Poleg povečanja deleža oseb, ki so leta 2021 v polovici držav članic živele pod pragom revščine, podatki o nedohodkih za leto 2022, ki zajemajo zgodnje faze krize življenjskih stroškov, odražajo vse večje finančne težave, s katerimi se srečujejo gospodinjstva. Te težave bi bilo mogoče ublažiti s ciljno usmerjenimi politikami, ki bi obravnavale neenakomeren učinek, ki ga imajo hitro naraščajoče ravni cen na gospodinjstva.

The report contains the following lists of tables and figures.

List of tables

Table 1: Multiple indicators demonstrating declining EU-wide income disparities (2007–2022)
Table 2: Income levels and income inequality have evolved differently across European regions, from the best performance in CEE countries to the most disappointing in Mediterranean countries (levels in 2007 and change over 2007–2022)
Table 3: Composition of each income class by sociodemographic characteristics, EU27, 2007 and 2022 (%)
Table A1: Summary of empirical studies estimating inequality in EU Member States during the COVID-19 pandemic
Table A2: Multiple indicators point to declining EU-wide income disparities between 2006 and 2021 (excluding Germany)
Table A3: Changes in inequality when moving from market income to household disposable income, EU Member States, yearly average data over 2007–2022 (%)

List of figures

Figure 1: EU-wide population by equivalised household disposable income in PPP euro, 2022 (%)
Figure 2: EU-wide income inequality falls (EU-wide Gini index including and excluding Germany, Gini unweighted average and unemployment rate, 2007–2022)
Figure 3: Income convergence pushes EU-wide income inequality downwards (Theil index, 2007–2022)
Figure 4: Income growth in the EU-wide bottom income quintiles outpaces that in the top quintile (changes in income levels, by quintile, EU-wide, 2007–2022)
Figure 5: Bottom EU-wide income deciles perform better in economic upturns while top deciles perform worse (changes in income over four subperiods, by decile, EU-wide, 2007–2022, %)
Figure 6: Average income levels vary greatly across EU Member States, 2022 (€)
Figure 7: Upward income convergence between EU Member States (real income in PPP-adjusted euro in 2007 and change over 2007–2022)
Figure 8: Income convergence between EU Member States is stronger in times of economic expansion (real income in PPP-adjusted euro and average yearly change over subperiods, %)
Figure 9: Income levels expanded during the pandemic, albeit more moderately than previously (changes in real income levels in three periods, EU Member States, 2019–2022, %)
Figure 10: Economic convergence explains income convergence between EU Member States (average income, GDP per capita and unemployment rate, 2007–2022, %)
Figure 11: Diverging cross-country patterns in income inequality leading to significant changes in the positioning of Member States, 2007 and 2022 (upper panel: Gini index; lower panel: ranking)
Figure 12: Differences in income inequality based on different measures of income, EU Member States, 2022 (Gini index)
Figure 13: Trajectories in the evolution of income inequality, wage inequality and employment level, EU Member States, 2007–2022
Figure 14: Change in real income level by income decile, EU Member States, 2007–2022 (%)
Figure 15: Evolution of inequality based on different measures of income, change in Gini index, EU Member States, 2007–2022 (%)
Figure 16: Wages contribute to income dynamics across EU countries (changes in real wage level by income decile, EU Member States, 2007–2022, %)
Figure 17: Rising employment and activity rates pushed inequality in annual labour earnings downwards (EU Member States, change over 2007–2022)
Figure 18: Smaller average household size reduces the redistributive role of the family (EU Member States, 2007 and 2022)
Figure 19: Changes in income inequality follow the business cycle (changes in Gini index by subperiod, EU Member States, 2007–2022, %)
Figure 20: Inequality trends are largely driven by income growth at the bottom of the income distribution (change in average income levels, by income decile across subperiods, average EU Member States, %)
Figure 21: Trends in wage levels largely explain income inequality (change in wage levels by income deciles across subperiods, average EU Member States, 2007–2022, %)
Figure 22: Growing unemployment played a role in driving income inequality during the Great Recession (change in shares of unemployed people, by income decile, average EU Member States, 2007–2021, percentage points)
Figure 23: The pandemic had a milder impact on European labour markets than the Great Recession (average yearly change in income inequality, wage inequality, real income and employment levels during the Great Recession and COVID-19 pandemic, EU Member States, %)
Figure 24: The relative position of the poorest 20% deteriorated as a result of the Great Recession (share of income, by income quintile, average EU Member States, 2007–2022)
Figure 25: Shares of income received by top and bottom income quintiles in 2022 (top panel) and changes between 2007 and 2022 (bottom panel), EU Member States
Figure 26: Palma index, 2007 and 2022, and change over time, EU Member States
Figure 27: Household market income and disposable income inequality are not closely related (Gini indices, EU Member States, 2022)
Figure 28: Reduction in income inequality after welfare state income redistribution, EU Member States, 2007–2022 (%)
Figure 29: Taxes are more progressive than benefits (shares of benefits received and taxes paid, by income decile, EU Member States’ yearly average over 2007–2022, %)
Figure 30: Progressiveness of benefit systems is mixed across the EU Member States (Share of taxes paid (upper panel) and benefits received (bottom panel), by income decile, yearly average over 2007–2022, %)
Figure 31: Pensions and income tax have the largest effect in moderating market income inequality (reduction in inequality after welfare state redistribution, by policy type, average EU Member States, %)
Figure 32: Pensions are more prevalent among high earners (shares of type of taxes (upper panel) and type of benefits (lower panel), by income decile, EU27 yearly average over 2007–2022, %)
Figure 33: The inequality-reduction role of the welfare state strengthened during the pandemic (change in income inequality after welfare state redistribution, EU Member States, %)
Figure 34: Social benefits expanded in the pandemic (change in amount spent on social benefits, by Member State (upper panel) and by type of policy (lower panel), 2020–2022, %)
Figure 35: Unemployment benefits expanded due to job retention schemes (change in amount spent on unemployment benefits and in the unemployment rate, EU Member States, 2021, %)
Figure 36: Welfare states prevented a more negative impact of the pandemic (changes in income inequality (upper panel) and income levels (lower panel), EU Member States, 2021, %)
Figure 37: The middle class constitutes a majority of the population across all Member States (sizes of income classes by household disposable income, 2022, %)
Figure 38: The middle class is much smaller before welfare state redistribution (sizes of income classes by market income, EU Member States, 2022, %)
Figure 39: Middle class size has remained stable on average across Member States (sizes of income classes, average EU Member States, 2007–2022, %)
Figure 40: The middle class shrank in most Member States (change in the size of middle class, 2007–2022)
Figure 41: The middle class tends to contract in economic downturns (change in size of middle class by subperiod, EU Member States, 2007–2022, percentage points)
Figure 42: Middle-class income levels grew similarly to those of the other classes (changes in real income levels, by income class, 2007–2022, %)
Figure 43: Trends in the share of income received by each income class are mixed (changes in the middle class’s share of income, EU Member States, 2007–2022)
Figure 44: Average cross-country patterns of income polarisation are stable (income distance, by income class, average EU Member States, %)
Figure 45: Mixed cross-country patterns in income polarisation (total (upper panel); in low- and high-income classes (middle panel); within the middle class (lower panel), EU Member States, 2007–2022)
Figure 46: Shares of people below the poverty threshold increased in most Member States, 2007 and 2022 (%)
Figure 47: Mixed cross-country patterns in the shares of people below the poverty threshold before and during the COVID-19 pandemic, EU Member States, 2020–2022 (%)
Figure 48: Households had more difficulty making ends meet in 2022 than in 2021 (shares of people in households reporting difficulty making ends meet, by Member State and income decile, %)
Figure 49: Difficulty keeping homes warm grew in 2022 (shares of people in households unable to keep the home adequately warm, by Member State and income decile, %)
Figure 50: Higher energy prices hit the most vulnerable groups hardest (shares of people in households unable to heat their home properly, EU27, 2021 and 2022, %)
Figure A1: Upward wage convergence between EU Member States (real wages in PPP-adjusted euro in 2007 and change over 2007–2022)
Figure A2: Changes in real income levels by income decile, by subperiod and EU Member State, 2007–2022 (%)
Figure A3: Changes in real wage levels by income decile, by subperiod and EU Member State, 2007–2022 (%)
Figure A4: Changes in the shares of unemployed people, by income decile, subperiod and EU Member State, 2008–2021 (percentage points)
Figure A5: Taxes (upper panel) and most social benefits (middle panel) are progressive, except pensions and sickness benefits (bottom panel) (share of benefits and taxes by income decile, EU Member States’ yearly average over 2007–2022, %)
Figure A6: Benefit systems are progressive across most Member States when pensions are excluded (shares of benefits (excluding pensions) by income decile, yearly average over 2007–2022, %)
Figure A7: Tax and benefit systems were more progressive in 2007 (shares of taxes (upper panel) and benefits (lower panel), by EU Member State and income decile, 2007, %)
Figure A8: Middle-class squeezes are more common in economic downturns (changes in size of middle class over subperiods, EU Member States, 2007–2022, percentage points)
Figure A9: Changes in real income levels by income class over subperiods, EU Member States, 2007–2022 (%)
Figure A10: It is much more difficult for households at the bottom of the income distribution to make ends meet (shares of people in households with difficulty making ends meet, by income decile, EU Member States, 2022)
Figure A11: Material deprivation advances in 2022 (shares of people experiencing material deprivation, by Member State (upper panel) and income decile (lower panel), %)
Figure A12: Shares of people living in materially deprived households, by EU Member State and income decile, 2022 (%)
Figure A13: People in the lowest-earning households are disproportionately affected by soaring energy prices (shares of people in households not able to keep their home adequately warm, by EU Member State and income decile, 2022, %)

Number of pages: 120

Reference nº: EF23034

ISBN: 978-92-897-2411-1

Catalogue nº: TJ-05-24-547-EN-N

DOI: 10.2806/477653

Permalink: eurofound.link/ef23034

Cite this publication
Eurofound (2024), Developments in income inequality and the middle class in the EU, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.